𝙏𝒊𝙜𝒓𝙖𝒊 𝑾𝙚𝒆𝙠𝒍𝙮 𝘿𝒊𝙜𝒆𝙨𝒕

Mekelle፡Telaviv, Nairobi, Pretoria, London, (Tigray Herald)

“𝙏𝒊𝙜𝒓𝙖𝒊 𝑾𝙚𝒆𝙠𝒍𝙮 𝘿𝒊𝙜𝒆𝙨𝒕

Written by Teshome Beyene

This week felt like an echo of the last—still heavy with the ripple effects of recent political shifts. The new development is the DDR, in the backburner for months, and now to gather momentum.

Tigrai’s new President, General Tadesse— a target of activists’ parody for his overuse of filler words—seemed to hit the ground running initially. However, he is yet to form his Cabinet, and in Tigrai’s case, everyday counts.

All the same, he met with his cabinet (for the second time) and outlined three key goals for his one-year term:

✅Restore law and order ✅Revitalize the economy
✅Fully implement the Pretoria Agreement

During a meeting with heads of bureaus on their quarterly plans, he didn’t mince words. He warned that Tigrai is dangerously polarized, both internally and across the diaspora. He stressed that unity is fraying as divisive narratives continue to spread.

Tadese has come up with a rallying cry: 𝒏𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒂𝒍 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏—a phrase long avoided under EPRDF rule. According to him, a region-wide conference is on the horizon to kickstart that process. The devil, however, is in the details. What period would this reconciliation process cover? Which parties? and What matters? and so it goes, ad infinitum. Even so, the initiative should be WELCOME despite its trickiness!

⚠️M𝑦 𝑐a𝑢t𝑖o𝑛a𝑟y n𝑜t𝑒 𝑜n the national conference 𝑖s s𝑖m𝑝l𝑒: if the planned regional conference echoes the cumbersome, performative forums of the dominant TPLF years—long on theatrics, short on reform —it will be dead on arrival.

Tadese also hinted that the tense relationship between the regional government and the ruling party (TPLF) must be addressed head-on.

𝐍𝐨𝐰, 𝐥𝐞𝐭’𝐬 𝐮𝐧𝐩𝐚𝐜𝐤 𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐬𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬.
Restoring law and order?
That might be achievable in the short term—with enough government muscle.✌️

Reviving the economy?
Much harder🤔

Like all other regions, Tigrai remains heavily dependent on federal subsidies. Yet, its allocated budget has remained stagnant in nominal terms for over four years—and has declined substantially in real terms. To put this in perspective: this year, Tigrai’s Federal subsidy budget stands at ETB 12.8 billion, while the Somali Region—with a comparable population—has received about ETB 20 billion, a staggering 56% more.

It is disheartening to learn this, especially when Tigrai should have been given a fiscal boost to help it emerge from crisis—not subjected to disparities that deepen its challenges.

Private sector activity is dampened. Youth unemployment is definitely high. Both entrepreneurs and job seekers are quietly migrating to Addis Ababa and the Middle East respectively. New foreign direct investment? Virtually non-existent.

Pretoria Agreement?
It takes huge bravery to take on😡The earlier claim by Getachew Reda blaming Tigrai’s own structures for implementation delays is a non-starter. The TPLF does not seem to share this evaluation, nor do well-meaning independent observers.

In any case, Tigrai remains to be the region with a large chunk of its territory (40%) under occupation—by both a neighboring region and a foreign country. And nearly 20% of its population remains displaced.

This is the same region whose sons and daughters bitterly fought, to shape a shared national destiny, whatever one’s take on that chapter. Tigrai now finds itself stripped of the very aspirations it helped forge. While non-existent regions, as states, came to be formed along language and culture lines (all of them actually), Tigrai – a region that long survived changing regimes -, paradoxically, has lost even parts of its own historic territory.

Meanwhile, the Federal Government sits comfortably in the center, employing delay tactics, shifting narratives, and layered legal manoeuvring — not to resolve the occupation, but to prolong it. Or worse, to normalize and eventually codify it.

Tigrai is preparing to demilitarize itself. In the first phase, it will disarm 60,000 of its battle-hardened sons and daughters—three months from now. The implications of the terse, one-page Terms of Reference signed last week by President Tadese in Addis, is beginning to sink in.

Point number 𝓽𝔀𝓸 of the ToR is already biting.

The baffling part? Tigrai appears to be trading this for not much in return. Western Tigrai remains in the hands of the occupiers.
Another key development: the 𝐓𝐢𝐠𝐫𝐚𝐢 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐜𝐢𝐥 held a bold and confident press conference this week. In the current context, the chair and vice-chair asserted, the Council remains the most inclusive and effective body to lead Tigrai.

This came after a diplomatic tour in Addis Ababa, where Council members met with embassy officials from the US, UK, France, Scandinavia, Belgium, Italy, and others—along with unspecified federal officials.

In the tour, according to them, their message focused squarely on the Pretoria Agreement and the Council’s potential as a civil, all-inclusive mechanism to address Tigrai’s challenges. They described their diplomatic outreach as successful—though they were notably quiet about how things went with the federal side. Still, they emphasized that Tigrai’s territorial integrity and the slow implementation of the peace deal were central to discussion with the Federal government.

ᏴᏬᎢ ᎻᎬᎡᎬ’Ꮪ ᎢᎻᎬ ᏟᎪᎢᏟᎻ !

Since his appointment, President Tadesse hasn’t once acknowledged the Council. This is the very body established as a stand-in for elected representation—something General Tsadikan and Getachew Reda worked hard to bring about.

The Council’s leaders voiced thinly veiled concern. They expected the President to engage with them by now. when he laid out his government’s three-month plan, there was no indication the Council would have any role in reviewing it. The Council insists that government plans must be submitted to and approved by them. They’ve now formally invited him for a joint meeting.

So—is this the beginning of an institutional standoff? Executive vs. Council? or Tadesse vs. Council? Let’s hope not. Time will tell.
Tigrai cannot afford another internal rift.

Meanwhile, another telling shift: Professor Kindeya Gebrehiwot has been appointed advisor to Professor Berhanu Nega, the minister for education. Kindeya, a close ally of Getachew Reda, previously held a senior role in the regional cabinet—but had been notably quiet in recent months.

One thing’s clear: the federal government is courting senior Tigrai figures. Will others follow? Will heavy-weight leaders like General Tsadikan or General Teklay (aka Wedi Ashebir) also make their way to Addis? If they do, it’s a political jackpot for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. To the outside world—and to many non-Tigrayan Ethiopians—it reinforces his narrative: that of magnanimity, inclusiveness, and vindication of his past stance and actions on Tigrai.

Whether that’s genuine change or just political theatre remains to be seen. Personally, I lean towards the latter. One thing should be underlined, however, if one is to make an early sense of what the Premier is doing. So far, the portfolios are relatively easy to dispose as they are only advisory roles. Besides, the two appointments are a far cry from a fair representation for Tigrai in Federal affairs and government.

On the other spectrum, there is an exciting news. The all-famous 𝐃𝐫 𝗧𝗲𝗱𝗿𝗼𝘀 𝗔𝗱𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗼𝗺 hailing from Tigrai has been named by Time Magazine as one of top 100 global influencers, a spot extremely hard to secure. He ascribed the accolade to the hard-working men and women in his organization – a fittingly humble attribution.
𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒖𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔 👏

Finally, in my assessment, in the short-run, issues of paramount importance will be how President Tadesse handles the Provisional Council, and what his Cabinet will look like – how competent, diverse and matured.

Happy EASTER Holiday!