Mekelle፡Telaviv, Nairobi, Pretoria, London, (Tigray Herald)
Assab Port: Ethiopia’s Lost Jewel on the Red Sea and the Road to Reclamation
By Asrat
Part One
Introduction
Ethiopia’s loss of direct sea access following Eritrea’s independence in 1993 has significantly impacted its strategic and economic development. The Red Sea port of Assab, historically Ethiopia’s primary maritime outlet, remains central to Ethiopian aspirations for coastline access.
Ethiopian leaders, notably Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, have explicitly articulated the seriousness of being landlocked, describing it as an existential threat, asserting that “150 million people cannot reside in a geographical prison… [the prison] will blast somewhere.”
This article presents a detailed legal-historical analysis supporting Ethiopia’s claim to Assab, exploring historical ties, colonial treaties, international law doctrines (historic title, effective control, estoppel, and equity), and international legal precedents. Additionally, it examines potential diplomatic and legal pathways Ethiopia can pursue, anticipates Eritrea’s likely counterarguments, and proposes practical recommendations to address the issue diplomatically while preventing conflict.
Historical Background of Assab and Ethiopian Sovereignty
Assab, strategically located on the Red Sea coast, became Italy’s first colonial possession in Africa in the late 19th century. Between 1869 and 1882, the Italian shipping company Rubattino acquired the Assab coastal strip from local Afar rulers, marking Italy’s initial presence on the Red Sea.
During Italy’s colonial administration (1890–1941), Assab was designated a free-trade zone to facilitate Ethiopia’s maritime needs, connected by significant road infrastructure linking Assab directly to Ethiopia’s interior Late 19th-century Ethiopian emperors strongly resisted foreign encroachment.
Emperor Yohannes IV and his general Ras Alula notably battled Egyptian and Italian forces along the Red Sea coast, asserting, “Ethiopia’s natural frontier is the Red Sea.” Emperor Menelik II initially conceded Eritrea’s highlands under the controversial 1889 Treaty of Wuchale, but after uncovering Italy’s deceptive dual-text treaty—claiming Ethiopia as an Italian protectorate—he decisively defeated Italy at the Battle of Adwa in 1896.
However, logistical and geopolitical pressures prevented Menelik from fully reclaiming the coastal territories. He explicitly stated, “I cannot consent that the sea frontier, which naturally belongs to Ethiopia, be entirely taken away by Italy,” illustrating Ethiopia’s enduring maritime claim.
Following World War II, Allied powers explicitly recognized Ethiopia’s maritime needs during diplomatic discussions. Even Italy acknowledged Ethiopia’s legitimate claims, suggesting frontier adjustments or establishing special economic zones at Assab and Massawa.
This international recognition led directly to the UN-backed federation in 1952 (UN Resolution 390(V)), explicitly designed to address Ethiopia’s maritime rights.
Assab subsequently became Ethiopia’s critical maritime gateway, handling roughly 70% of Ethiopia’s trade by the 1960s. Ethiopia invested significantly in Assab, constructing extensive port facilities, major roads, an oil refinery with a production capacity of approximately 500,000 tons annually established in 1967, and significant naval installations, reinforcing Ethiopia’s effective control and administrative presence.
Ethiopian Objections to Foreign Control (Menelik II to the Derg)
Throughout Italian colonial rule and subsequent Eritrean separatism, Ethiopian leaders consistently resisted losing Assab. Emperor Menelik’s treaties with Italy (1900, 1902, 1908) were explicitly signed under duress, with Menelik openly protesting Italy’s territorial claims.
Emperor Haile Selassie persistently sought Eritrea’s reunification post-WWII, testifying before the United Nations in 1949: “Eritrea has historically been a province of Ethiopia, and its people are our brothers.” His diplomatic efforts resulted in the 1952 federation explicitly recognizing Ethiopia’s legitimate maritime rights.
Dissatisfied with continued constraints, Haile Selassie dissolved Eritrean autonomy in 1962, integrating Eritrea fully into Ethiopia, a stance reinforced by the Organization of African Unity’s 1964 resolution on colonial boundaries
The Derg regime (1974–1991) unequivocally maintained Eritrea’s integral status, explicitly rejecting separatism as illegal. The regime conducted military operations asserting Assab’s strategic and economic importance, consistently objecting diplomatically to external recognition of Eritrean separatist claims.
Only Ethiopia’s transitional government (1991–1993) controversially accepted Eritrea’s independence without explicitly securing maritime guarantees—conditional recognition based upon implicit understandings of continued Ethiopian access—a decision heavily criticized by Ethiopian nationalists as politically expedient rather than a legitimate relinquishment of Ethiopia’s historical maritime rights. Eritrea’s expulsion of UN peacekeepers (UNMEE) in 2006 constituted a clear material breach of these implicit agreements, legitimizing Ethiopia’s position to reconsider prior recognitions.
Colonial-Era Treaties and International Recognition
Ethiopia’s legal claims heavily challenge the validity of colonial-era treaties, notably the Treaty of Wuchale (1889), Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896), and Italo-Ethiopian boundary agreements (1900–1908). These agreements were fundamentally invalidated by Italy’s deceit, coercion, and breaches—particularly Italy’s unprovoked 1935 invasion of Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie explicitly informed the League of Nations in 1936, “Italy’s invasion nullifies every previous treaty… Ethiopia no longer acknowledges any prior territorial concessions.”
Post-WWII diplomatic records from the United States, United Kingdom, France, and USSR explicitly supported Ethiopia’s legitimate maritime rights. The 1952 UN federation represented a clear international attempt to permanently rectify colonial injustices, explicitly addressing Ethiopia’s “legitimate need for adequate sea access.”
Legal Doctrines and International Law
Ethiopia’s claims can also rely on international legal doctrines:
1. Historic Title: Demonstrated through centuries-long administrative connections to the Red Sea coast, supported by historical maps clearly depicting Ethiopian sovereignty extending to the coastline.
2. Effective Control (Effectivités): Substantial Ethiopian investments and administrative presence from 1952–1991, clearly aligned with international precedents like the ICJ’s Pedra Branca ruling.
3. Estoppel and Acquiescence: Ethiopia’s conditional recognition of Eritrea’s independence explicitly linked to continued access, breached explicitly by Eritrea in 2006.
4. Equity and Vital Interests: Ethiopia’s economic hardships as a landlocked country, with import-export costs rising approximately 40% post-Assab loss (World Bank, 2022), reinforce equitable arguments under international law.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Ethiopia’s historical resistance, extensive infrastructural investments, explicit international recognition, and robust legal foundations offer strong grounds for reclaiming equitable maritime rights to Assab.
Ethiopia should prioritize peaceful diplomatic avenues, advocating for equitable solutions such as joint economic zones or special administrative agreements, referencing successful international precedents like Namibia’s peaceful reclamation of Walvis Bay and Bolivia’s persistent diplomatic efforts regarding maritime access.
References:
1.Giorgis, Dawit. Red Tears: War, Famine, and Revolution in Ethiopia. Red Sea Press, 1989.
(Details Ethiopia’s historical connections to the Red Sea and Assab specifically.)
2.Tekuya, Mahemud. “Ethiopia’s Quest for Access to the Red Sea.” Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 47, no. 1, 2024, pp. 1–52.
(Legal and historical analysis emphasizing Ethiopia’s maritime rights and claims.)
3.United Nations General Assembly Resolution 390(V), December 2, 1950. UN Digital Library. Available online: digitallibrary.un.org.
(Official UN resolution establishing Eritrea-Ethiopia federation, explicitly referencing Ethiopia’s need for maritime access.)
4.Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) Decision, April 13, 2002. Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague. Available online: pca-cpa.org.
(Final legal ruling defining territorial sovereignty, explicitly placing Assab within Eritrean territory.)
5.Algiers Agreement (Peace Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea), December 12, 2000. Available online: peaceagreements.org.
(Treaty marking the formal end of hostilities, establishing the EEBC.)
6.International Court of Justice (ICJ). Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh (Malaysia v. Singapore), Judgment, May 23, 2008. ICJ Reports 2008, p. 12. Available online: icj-cij.org.
(Legal precedent for effective administrative control—“effectivités.”)
7.United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), December 10, 1982. Article 125: Rights of Access to and from the Sea for Land-Locked States. UN Treaty Series. Available online: un.org.
(Defines rights and conditions for landlocked countries’ maritime access.)
8.World Bank. “The Challenges Facing Landlocked Developing Countries.” World Bank Report, 2022. Available online: worldbank.org.
(Statistical data on economic impacts of landlocked status.)
9.Organization of African Unity (OAU). “Resolution AHG/Res.16(I) on Border Disputes Among African States,” Cairo, July 1964. Available online: au.int.
(Establishes principle of respect for colonial-era borders—“uti possidetis juris.”)
10.Rothwell, Donald R., and Tim Stephens. The International Law of the Sea. 2nd ed., Hart Publishing, 2016.
(Provides comprehensive context on international maritime legal doctrines, especially transit rights.)
11.Shaw, Malcolm N. International Law. 9th ed., Cambridge University Press, 2021.
(General principles of international law relevant to estoppel, historic title, and treaty validity.)
