Tigray’s Fragmentation: Consequences and Paths Forward
Writen by፡
Gidey Gebreegziabher (PhD Candidate at the University of Warsaw, Poland)
1. Introduction
The Tigray region, long a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s political history and cultural heritage, has undergone catastrophic fragmentation since the outbreak of war in November 2020. What originated as a political dispute and military confrontation between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed rapidly escalated into a devastating conflict marked by extreme ethnic violence, the collapse of regional governance, and significant external involvement from Eritrea and regional actors (de Waal, 2021).
This multidimensional fragmentation political, economic, and social has fundamentally altered Tigray’s trajectory, dismantling institutions, displacing millions, and creating one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises. Understanding the complex interplay of factors driving this disintegration is paramount for formulating effective responses that address both immediate human suffering and the foundations for lasting peace and stability (International Crisis Group, 2021).This fragmentation has deep historical roots intertwined with Ethiopia’s complex federal structure. Tigray’s dominant role in the previous EPRDF government (led by the TPLF) created significant resentment among other ethnic groups and the central state apparatus. The political reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed after 2018, perceived by the TPLF as marginalizing Tigray and threatening its autonomy, fueled tensions that culminated in the fateful clash over the timing of regional elections and the federal government’s attempt to assert control over Tigray’s security forces (Berhe, 2020). The subsequent federal intervention, characterized by accusations of “law enforcement,” quickly spiraled beyond its initial scope, unleashing forces that shattered the existing political order within Tigray and severely damaged the relationship between the region and the federal center (Tronvoll, 2021).
The human cost of this fragmentation has been staggering and constitutes a profound social rupture. Conservative estimates suggest hundreds of thousands died due to violence, starvation, and lack of healthcare during the active conflict phases (ACLED, 2023). Millions were internally 1displaced or fled as refugees, while systematic atrocities, including widespread sexual violence, massacres, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, inflicted deep collective trauma (Ethiopian Human Rights Commission [EHRC] & OHCHR, 2021; Amnesty International, 2022). A deliberate siege severely restricted access to food, medicine, and basic services, pushing large populations to the brink of famine and creating long-term health and developmental setbacks (IPC, 2021; UN OCHA, 2023). The social fabric, built on communal ties and trust, has been severely damaged, complicating prospects for reconciliation.
Regionally, the conflict drew in neighboring Eritrea, whose forces played a decisive and brutal role alongside Ethiopian federal troops, pursuing long-standing animosity towards the TPLF (Plaut, 2021). This external intervention significantly intensified the violence and fragmentation. The involvement of forces from Ethiopia’s Amhara region in western Tigray, coupled with allegations of ethnic cleansing and forced displacement to alter demographics, added another layer of complexity and potential for future conflict (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Reuters, 2023). The geopolitical fallout extended beyond the Horn of Africa, straining international relations and exposing limitations in global conflict resolution mechanisms, despite attempts at mediation.
Despite the formal cessation of hostilities following the Pretoria Agreement in November 2022, the path towards reversing Tigray’s fragmentation remains fraught. Political reintegration is hampered by deep mistrust, contested territorial claims (especially Western Tigray), and a fragile, incomplete disarmament and demobilization process (International Crisis Group, 2023). The neartotal destruction of the regional economy and public infrastructure requires massive, sustained investment for recovery, while addressing the immense social trauma and facilitating justice for atrocities are critical yet unresolved challenges (World Bank, 2024). Sustainable peace hinges on genuine political dialogue addressing Tigray’s future status within Ethiopia, credible transitional justice, the withdrawal of all external forces, and the reconstruction of social trust a monumental task demanding unwavering commitment from all parties and the international community.
1 Historical Context of Tigray
Tigray’s distinct identity is deeply rooted in antiquity, most prominently through the Axumite Kingdom (c. 100 BCE–940 CE). This powerful civilization, centered in the Tigrayan highlands, emerged as one of Africa’s earliest and most influential states, renowned for its monumental obelisks, sophisticated stone architecture, and extensive trade networks spanning the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. Axum’s adoption of Christianity in the 4th century CE, under King Ezana, positioned it as a major center of early African Christianity, shaping its cultural and religious character for millennia (Phillipson, 2012). The kingdom’s development of its own script (Ge’ez) and minting of coins further signified its advanced statecraft and administrative sophistication, establishing a legacy of political centrality that remains foundational to Tigrayan self-perception (Connah, 2015).
The Tigrinya language, a direct descendant of Ge’ez, serves as a vital pillar of continuity linking modern Tigrayans to their Axumite heritage. It functions not merely as a means of communication but as a repository of historical memory, liturgical practice, and cultural expression. Similarly, the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church has been instrumental in preserving Tigray’s unique identity through centuries of political upheaval. Ancient monasteries like Debre Damo (accessible only by rope), Abuna Yemata Guh (carved into cliffs), and Gheralta complexes acted as isolated sanctuaries, safeguarding invaluable illuminated manuscripts, ecclesiastical traditions, and religious scholarship from external influence or destruction for over 1,500 years (Kaplan, 2009; Binns, 2017). This deep intertwining of faith, language, and historical consciousness fostered a resilient communal bond.
Tigray’s geography characterized by rugged highlands, deep gorges, and defensible plateaus profoundly shaped its historical development and collective psychology. This challenging terrain fostered a culture of self-reliance, endurance, and localized governance. Communities developed sophisticated agricultural terracing systems and water management techniques to sustain life in often Arid conditions, reinforcing independence from central lowland powers (Crummey, 2000). The mountains also provided natural fortifications, enabling resistance against external domination and nurturing a self-image as a bastion of Ethiopian sovereignty, a perception solidified by key historical events like the defeat of foreign invaders.
This geographic isolation and historical experience cultivated a strong sense of political distinctiveness and autonomy. Tigrayans often viewed themselves as the guardians of coreEthiopian traditions (monarchy, Orthodox Christianity) against perceived threats, whether from southern-based empires, Muslim sultanates, or later European colonizers. Figures like Emperor Yohannes IV (r. 1872-1889), who made Mekelle his capital, embodied this Tigrayan-centric vision of Ethiopian statehood and defense (Tibebu, 1995). This historical narrative underpins a persistent regional consciousness that prioritizes self-determination within the broader Ethiopian polity.
Consequently, Tigray’s historical identity is not merely a relic of the past but a living, dynamic force that actively informs contemporary political consciousness and aspirations. The memory of Axumite glory, the endurance of the Church and language through periods of isolation, and the legacy of resistance against subjugation collectively form a powerful narrative of resilience and distinctiveness. This deep-seated identity, forged over millennia in a unique geographical and historical crucible, provides essential context for understanding Tigray’s assertive role in modern 4Ethiopian politics and its profound reaction to perceived marginalization in the post-EPRDF era (Clapham, 1988; Fegley, 2021).
1.1. Regional Role
Tigray’s strategic location bordering Eritrea to the north and Sudan to the west has historically amplified its geopolitical significance far beyond its size. This position placed it at the crossroads of trade routes and military campaigns, making it both a gateway and a buffer zone. The region bore the brunt of numerous conflicts, most notably serving as the primary battleground during the devastating 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War, which inflicted massive casualties, displacement, and economic damage on Tigrayan communities (Negash & Tronvoll, 2000). This experience deeply ingrained a sense of vulnerability to external threats, particularly from Eritrea, while simultaneously highlighting the region’s critical role in national defense.
The crowning moment in Tigray’s (and Ethiopia’s) narrative of regional defiance was the decisive Battle of Adwa (1896), where Emperor Menelik II’s forces, with significant Tigrayan leadership and troops under Ras Alula and others, routed the invading Italian army. Fought on Tigrayan soil, Adwa became a symbol of African resistance to colonialism and a core element of Tigrayan pride and identity. The victory cemented the region’s self-perception as the shield of Ethiopian independence and established a legacy of military prowess and sacrifice for the nation (Jonas, 2011; Reid, 2011). This historical event remains a potent reference point in Tigrayan political discourse.
Following the overthrow of the Derg in 1991, Tigrayan leaders, primarily through the TPLF’s dominance of the EPRDF coalition, exerted outsized influence on Ethiopia’s foreign policy for nearly three decades. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi (1995-2012), a Tigrayan, was a key regional strategist. He positioned Ethiopia as a stabilizing force, mediating conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, promoting the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and pursuing a policy of containing perceived Islamist threats (particularly from Eritrea and Somalia) which often aligned with Western security interests (Jacquin-Berdal, 2009; Plaut, 2016). This era saw Tigrayan political elites shaping the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical landscape.
A complex layer of Tigray’s regional role involves its relationship with Eritrea. The shared Tigrinya language and cultural heritage across the border fostered historical notions of panTigrinya solidarity. However, political trajectories diverged sharply after Eritrea’s independence 5in 1993. The brutal 1998-2000 war, primarily fought over contested border territories like Badme, transformed this solidarity into deep-seated hostility between the TPLF and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF/Isaias Afwerki regime) (Iyob, 2000). This animosity became a defining feature of regional politics.
The outbreak of the Tigray War in 2020 saw this historical animosity reach its zenith. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s strategic alliance with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, facilitating the direct and large-scale invasion of Tigray by Eritrean forces, represented a catastrophic rupture. Eritrean troops played a decisive and notoriously brutal role, targeting civilians and infrastructure, which shattered any residual notions of cross-border Tigrinya solidarity (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Plaut, 2021). This intervention, driven by President Isaias’s determination to destroy the TPLF, profoundly intensified the conflict’s violence and fragmentation, demonstrating the dangerous interplay of historical grievances, regime survival strategies, and Tigray’s precarious position as a borderland region within volatile regional geopolitics (International Crisis Group, 2021; Tronvoll, 2021).
2. Causes of Fragmentation
2.1. Political and Governance Challenges
Ethiopia’s ethnic federalist system, established by the 1995 constitution under TPLF dominance, was designed to manage the country’s extraordinary diversity by granting ethnolinguistic groups self-determination and regional autonomy. However, in practice, it became a primary driver of fragmentation. The system institutionalized ethnicity as the primary political identity, transforming regional states into competitive power centers vying for resources and influence. This framework amplified ethno-nationalist sentiments and territorial disputes, particularly between Tigray and neighboring Amhara over areas like Welkait/Tsegede (Western Tigray), rather than fostering unity (Abbink, 2011; Aalen, 2011). The TPLF’s near-hegemonic control of the federal government (EPRDF) from 1991 to 2018 bred deep resentment among other ethnic elites, who perceived Tigrayan leadership as extractive and exclusionary, despite claims of “revolutionary democracy” (Lefort, 2010; Crisis Group, 2009).
The rise of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, initially promising reform and unity, dramatically accelerated fragmentation. His dissolution of the EPRDF coalition and creation of the centralist Prosperity Party (PP) was perceived in Tigray as a deliberate dismantling of the constitutional 6federal compact and an existential threat to regional autonomy. Abiy’s rhetoric of “Medemer” (synergy) clashed with actions seen as purging Tigrayans from key security, military, and bureaucratic positions a move framed as anti-corruption but viewed as collective punishment (de Waal, 2018; ICG, 2020). Tigray’s regional government, still controlled by the TPLF, interpreted this as a revocation of their constitutional rights, leading to a defiant unilateral regional election in September 2020. The federal government’s declaration of this election as “illegal” and subsequent suspension of budget transfers and dialogue set the stage for military confrontation (Human Rights Watch, 2020; Tronvoll, 2020).
Post-war political dynamics within Tigray itself became a critical source of internal fragmentation. The Tigray Interim Administration (TIA), established after the November 2022 Pretoria Agreement, was nominally led by the TPLF but quickly revealed profound internal fractures. A power struggle emerged between the dominant faction loyal to Debretsion Gebremichael (the prewar president) and figures like Getachew Reda (appointed interim president in March 2023), who advocated for greater pragmatism in dealing with Addis Ababa (ICG, 2023). This resulted in parallel governance structures, inconsistent policy implementation, and public confusion, severely weakening the region’s ability to present a unified front in negotiations with the federal government or coordinate reconstruction (International Crisis Group, 2024; personal communication with humanitarian officials, Mekelle, Feb 2024).
The federal government’s continued refusal to formally recognize the TPLF as a legal political party post-Pretoria has perpetuated political limbo and distrust. This exclusion marginalizes the dominant political force in Tigray from the national political arena, hindering meaningful dialogue about the region’s future status. Simultaneously, the disputed status of Western Tigray (Welkait/Tsegede) remains the most explosive unresolved territorial issue. Despite the Pretoria Agreement’s call for resolution through constitutional processes, the area remains under de facto Amhara regional control, supported by federal security forces. Reports of systematic ethnic cleansing of Tigrayans, forced displacement, land confiscation, and demographic engineering continue, rendering the area inaccessible to Tigrayan authorities and displaced populations, making any political settlement precarious (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Reuters, 2023; Ethiopia Insight, 2024).
Consequently, the failure to rebuild legitimate and inclusive governance at both regional and federal levels is a core cause of ongoing fragmentation. The absence of a credible political process 7to address Tigray’s constitutional status, security guarantees, and contested territories sustains an environment of fear, uncertainty, and resentment. This governance vacuum prevents effective administration, justice delivery, and reconciliation, leaving the population vulnerable to exploitation by competing factions and external actors, and cementing the fractures opened by the war (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011; de Waal, 2023).
2.2. Armed Conflicts and External Pressures
The outbreak of full-scale war in November 2020 marked the catastrophic escalation of political tensions into a conflict of devastating brutality and fragmentation. Triggered by a TPLF attack on federal army bases in Tigray and the federal government’s subsequent “law enforcement operation,” the conflict rapidly engulfed the region. Fighting quickly involved not only the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and TPLF forces (Tigray Defense Forces – TDF), but also the Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) and Amhara regional militias (Fano). The human cost was staggering. Credible estimates suggest over 600,000 conflict-related deaths by late 2022, primarily civilians succumbing to violence, starvation, and denied healthcare, alongside millions forcibly displaced (BBC, 2023; UN OCHA, 2023; Ghent University & Mekelle University joint estimate cited in The Conversation, 2023).
Eritrea’s intervention proved decisive and devastatingly brutal. President Isaias Afwerki, motivated by a deep-seated personal and political vendetta against the TPLF dating back to the 1998-2000 border war, seized the opportunity to eliminate his arch-rival. Eritrean forces invaded Tigray within days of the conflict’s start, operating with significant autonomy and coordination with ENDF units. They were implicated in widespread and systematic atrocities, including massacres (e.g., Axum, Dengelat), sexual violence as a weapon of war, deliberate starvation tactics, and wholesale looting of infrastructure and resources (Human Rights Watch, 2021; EHRC-OHCHR, 2021; The New York Times, 2021). Eritrea’s involvement transformed the conflict from an internal Ethiopian dispute into a regional war of annihilation, significantly complicating ceasefire negotiations and poisoning post-conflict relations.
The conflict was further prolonged and intensified by the involvement of external arms suppliers. Despite a federal arms embargo, Ethiopia acquired sophisticated armed drones critical to countering early TDF advances. Turkey supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones, Iran provided Mohajer-6 and Shahed variants, and the UAE was also implicated in logistical or intelligence support, often routed through Eritrean airfields (SIPRI, 2023; Africa Report, 2022; Foreign Policy, 2023). These 8drones enabled devastating airstrikes on civilian infrastructure (markets, hospitals, schools) and TDF positions, altering battlefield dynamics but failing to deliver a decisive victory for Addis Ababa. This external military support, driven by geopolitical interests in the Red Sea region, prolonged the suffering and hindered diplomatic efforts.
Regional tensions beyond Eritrea significantly influenced the conflict’s trajectory. The longstanding dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) created a complex backdrop. Egypt and Sudan, deeply suspicious of Ethiopian intentions, were accused by Addis Ababa of providing tacit support or sanctuary to the TPLF/TDF, fueling Ethiopian security paranoia (The New Yorker, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2021). Simultaneously, a separate border conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Sudan in the al-Fashaga area (adjacent to Western Tigray) in late 2020, partly driven by Amhara militias redeployed from Tigray. This created a multi-front security challenge for Ethiopia and further destabilized the region, limiting diplomatic space for resolving the Tigray crisis (ICG, 2021; Sudan Tribune, 2023).
The cumulative effect of these external pressures was to transform the Tigray conflict from a localized political-military crisis into a protracted, multi-actor war with severe regional spillover. Eritrea’s brutal campaign entrenched fragmentation through terror and displacement. Drone warfare intensified destruction and civilian suffering. Regional rivalries over water and borders constrained diplomacy and fueled proxy dynamics. This complex web of external interventions fundamentally shaped the conflict’s brutality, duration, and the immense difficulty of achieving a sustainable peace that addresses the core drivers of fragmentation (Plaut, 2021; Verhoeven & Woertz, 2022).
2.3. Economic Decline and Societal Collapse
The deliberate economic strangulation of Tigray, orchestrated by the federal government,constituted a primary tool of warfare and a fundamental cause of societal fragmentation. Starting immediately after the November 2020 offensive, Addis Ababa imposed a comprehensive siege: cutting off all banking services, suspending telecommunications and internet access, blocking road, air, and rail transport, and halting all federal budget transfers. This blockade, maintained with varying intensity even after the Pretoria Agreement, prevented the entry of cash, fuel, commercial goods, fertilizers, seeds, and critically, humanitarian aid for months at a time (Amnesty International, 2021; AP News, 2023; The Lancet, 2023). The intent was to cripple the TPLF’s war 9economy, but its primary victims were civilians, plunging the entire region into a man-made famine.
The collapse of agricultural production, the backbone of Tigray’s economy, was catastrophic. The siege prevented farmers from accessing seeds and fertilizers during crucial planting seasons. Combined with widespread looting of livestock, seeds, and farming equipment by Eritrean and Ethiopian forces, the mass displacement of rural populations, and the destruction of irrigation infrastructure, farming became impossible across vast areas. Reports indicated that in 2021-2022, over 90% of the harvest was lost (FAO/WFP, 2022; IPC, 2023). This deliberate destruction of food systems triggered a famine surpassing the 1980s catastrophe, with starvation used systematically as a weapon of war, disproportionately affecting children, the elderly, and displaced people (Devex, 2022; Science, 2023).
The near-total destruction of public infrastructure and services shattered the foundations of society. An estimated 90% of health facilities were looted, vandalized, or destroyed, including hospitals stripped of beds, oxygen plants, ambulances, and even medical records (MSF, 2023; WHO, 2023). Schools, universities, factories, markets, and government buildings suffered similar fates. Power grids, water treatment plants, and telecommunications towers were targeted. This systematic demodernization reversed decades of development, leaving the population without access to healthcare, education, clean water, electricity, or basic commerce, forcing a regression into extreme vulnerability and dependence on inadequate external aid (World Bank Damage Assessment, 2024; UNDP, 2023).
The economic blockade and physical destruction led to mass unemployment and the collapse of markets. Factories were destroyed or idled due to lack of input and power. Small businesses collapsed without access to supplies, banking, or customers. Civil servants went unpaid for years. This resulted in a complete erosion of livelihoods and purchasing power. Hyperinflation made the remaining goods unaffordable. The disparities in resource allocation became starkly evident; while federal funds flowed to other regions for development, Tigray was systematically deprived, reinforcing deep-seated perceptions of intentional marginalization and collective punishment by the central state (Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2023; personal interviews with business owners, Mekelle & Adigrat, 2024). This economic apartheid deepened social fragmentation and resentment.10By early 2024, despite the nominal ceasefire, Tigray faced a protracted humanitarian catastrophe with profound long-term implications for societal cohesion. Over 13 million people across Tigray, Amhara, and Afar (the main conflict-affected regions) remained dependent on emergency food aid, with malnutrition rates, particularly among children, alarmingly high (ReliefWeb, 2024; UNICEF, 2024). The destruction of social and economic capital – human, physical, institutional, and financial – meant recovery would require decades of massive investment. This profound economic devastation, deliberately inflicted, has not only caused immense suffering but has fundamentally fragmented Tigrayan society, destroying the material basis for community life, trust, and future prosperity, creating fertile ground for continued instability and hindering any meaningful reintegration (World Bank, 2024; FEWS NET, 2024).
3. Social Divisions: Fractured Communities and Collective Trauma
The conflict in Tigray deliberately targeted the foundations of societal cohesion, weaponizing identity to inflict enduring fragmentation. Most devastating were the systematic campaigns of ethnic cleansing, predominantly executed by Amhara regional forces (Fano militias) and Eritrean troops in Western Tigray and border zones. These operations, characterized by mass killings, torture, sexual violence, and property destruction, aimed to permanently remove Tigrayans from contested territories like Welkait/Tsegede. Credible investigations documented forced expulsions of over 2.8 million Tigrayans, alongside the settlement of Amhara civilians into their homes and farms a deliberate strategy to alter demographics and sever ancestral ties to the land (Human Rights Watch, 2022; EHRC-OHCHR, 2021; Reuters, 2023). This engineered displacement shattered centuries-old communal bonds, neighborly trust, and shared social networks, replacing them with profound fear, hatred, and a crisis of belonging.
Gender-based violence (GBV) was deployed as a widespread and systematic weapon of war, constituting a catastrophic assault on Tigrayan women and girls and the broader social fabric. All conflict actors Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF), Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), Amhara Fano, and Tigrayan forces (TDF) perpetrated sexual atrocities, though evidence points to EDF and Fano militias as the most prolific perpetrators. Reports detailed mass rape campaigns, gang rapes, sexual slavery, mutilation, and rape-to-death scenarios, often accompanied by ethnic slurs to maximize humiliation and terror (Amnesty International, 2021; Le Monde, 2024; Tsegaye 11& Meckelburg, 2023). Perpetrators frequently targeted women and girls in front of family members, attacked those fleeing, or assaulted them in designated rape sites. The scale estimates suggest hundreds of thousands of survivors and the deliberate infliction of fistula as a lasting marker of trauma created a generation carrying severe psychological and physical wounds, compounded by pervasive stigma and near-total lack of accessible medical or psychosocial care during the siege (Physicians for Human Rights, 2023; WHO, 2024).
Tigray’s youth bore the brunt of generational trauma, their development and prospects shattered. The near-total destruction of the education system – thousands of schools looted, burned, or occupied by soldiers deprived an entire generation of formal learning for over three years. University campuses were systematically vandalized, libraries destroyed, and academic staff displaced or killed (UNESCO, 2023; Education Cluster Ethiopia, 2024). Many children witnessedextreme violence, experienced starvation, or were forced into displacement camps. Surveys revealed staggering levels of psychological distress: 58.8% of displaced children and adolescents exhibited symptoms consistent with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), alongside widespread depression, anxiety, and profound attachment disorders (Modern Diplomacy, 2025; Journal of Traumatic Stress, 2024). This trauma manifested in increased aggression, substance abuse, and hopelessness, severely hindering reintegration into schooling or community life and fueling cycles of potential future violence.
The scale and nature of displacement itself became a primary engine of social dissolution. Millions were displaced multiple times, fleeing village massacres, airstrikes, or advancing armies, leading to chaotic movements and the separation of families. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) crowded into overcrowded, unsanitary camps in towns like Shire or Mekelle, or sought refuge in remote rural areas lacking resources, creating fierce competition for scarce food, water, and shelter (IOM, 2023; IDMC, 2024). This massive disruption of social geography tore apart kinship structures, community leadership, and traditional support systems. Displacement camps became sites of extreme vulnerability, where IDPs faced exploitation, further gender-based violence, and the erosion of social norms and values. The loss of homes, livelihoods, and communal spaces stripped individuals of their social identity and agency, deepening dependency and despair (Hammond, 2024; Conflict and Health, 2023).
Consequently, Tigrayan society faces a profound psychosocial crisis threatening long-term stability. The cumulative impact of ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, mass displacement, 12witnessing atrocities, starvation, and the destruction of cultural heritage sites has created deepseated collective trauma and social distrust. Inter-communal relationships with Amhara and Eritrean communities are poisoned. Intra-community tensions fester due to differing war experiences (e.g., between those who fled and those who stayed, or accusations of collaboration). Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and religious institutions are overwhelmed. The pervasive culture of impunity for perpetrators denies victims justice or acknowledgment, embedding resentment and desires for vengeance (International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims, 2024; Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2025). Healing these deep social divisions requires more than physical reconstruction; it demands massive investment in traumainformed mental health services, community-led reconciliation processes, accountability for crimes, and the restoration of safe social spaces – a monumental task fundamental to preventing future cycles of fragmentation.
4. Consequences of Disintegration
4.1.Humanitarian Catastrophe: A Crisis in Perpetuity
The disintegration of Tigray has precipitated one of the world’s most severe humanitarian emergencies, characterized by systematic deprivation and institutionalized neglect. Over 760,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) are trapped in squalid, overcrowded camps across Shire, Adwa, and Mekelle, where minimal latrines, contaminated water sources, and near-total absence of healthcare fuel rampant disease. A single clinic might serve 30,000 people, with supplies of antibiotics, painkillers, and vaccines depleted for months due to aid blockades (ReliefWeb, 2025; MSF, 2024). This manufactured scarcity has perpetuated famine-like conditions (IPC Phase4+) for 40% of Tigray’s population, as federal bureaucratic obstructions including deliberate delays of aid convoys and weaponized customs inspections strangle food deliveries despite full UN warehouses in Djibouti (IPC, 2025; AP News, 2025).
The health system’s collapse has enabled deadly epidemics to metastasize unchecked. A cholera outbreak originating in displacement camps has infected 12,000 since late 2024, with case fatality rates exceeding 8% due to lack of oral rehydration salts and intravenous fluids (WHO, 2025). Concurrently, measles resurged among malnourished children, with 9,200 cases and 347 deaths reported in Q1 2025 alone directly attributable to vaccination rates plummeting below 15% during the siege (UNICEF, 2025). Sexual violence survivors face abandonment: fewer than 5% of an 13estimated 128,000 rape victims received clinical care, while psychological support reaches only 1% due to the destruction of 90% of mental health facilities and targeted killings of social workers (Refugees International, 2025; The Lancet, 2025).
Forced displacement has become permanent for many. Village-level erasure is widespread in Western Tigray, where Amhara militias systematically torched 12,000 homes and mined farmland to prevent return (Geospatial imagery analysis, Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2025). In central Tigray, 78% of displaced families report their homes were looted or destroyed by Eritrean troops, leaving no infrastructure to support reintegration (IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, 2025). Consequently, IDP camps evolve into permanent slums, where adolescents spend formative years without education or livelihoods, creating a “lost generation” psychologically scarred by chronic insecurity and stunted development (Journal of Refugee Studies, 2025).
The crisis is sustained by political design rather than natural disaster. Aid access denials intensified in 2025 under new federal regulations requiring 14 separate permits for each aid truck a policy condemned as a “starvation bureaucracy” by UN OCHA (May 2025 Report). Simultaneously, militarized aid theft continues, with documented cases of Ethiopian military units confiscating 500MT of World Food Program supplies for resale on black markets (Conflict Armament Research, 2025). This orchestrated humanitarian collapse functions as collective punishment, ensuring Tigray remains dependent and fragmented while deterring refugee returns that might challenge demographic engineering in occupied territories (Amnesty International, 2025).
4.2. Governance Vacuum: Fractured Authority and Escalating Anarchy
Post-conflict Tigray suffers a catastrophic power vacuum, where the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) remains paralyzed by factional warfare within the TPLF. The April 2025 appointment of ex-commander Tadesse Woreda as federal overseer backfired spectacularly, triggering armed clashes in Mekelle between pro-Debretsion loyalists and Getachew Reda’s faction. These battles killed 47 civilians in May 2025, revealing TIRA’s inability to control urban centers, let alone rural districts (Reuters, May 15, 2025; International Crisis Group, 2025).
This institutional collapse has empowered transnational criminal enterprises. Trafficking networks now operate with impunity along the Tekeze River corridor, smuggling arms from Sudan to Ethiopian militias while trafficking Tigrayan women to Gulf states via Sudan documented profits 14exceeded $4 million monthly in early 2025 (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2025; The Reporter Ethiopia, June 3, 2025). Concurrently, land-grabbing syndicates backed by Amhara and federal elites seized 180,000 hectares of fertile Western Tigray land, leasing it to commercial agribusinesses while former Tigrayan owners languish in IDP camps (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
Eritrea’s shadow governance further destabilizes the region. Despite nominal withdrawal, Eritrean intelligence (HGDEF) maintains 12 clandestine bases in Eastern Tigray, directing proxy militias to sabotage reconstruction. Satellite imagery confirms new trenches along the border, while Isaias Afwerki’s May 2025 speech threatening “final measures” against “TPLF remnants” signalimminent re-intervention (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2025; Janes Defense Weekly, 2025).
The vacuum enables ideological radicalization. Salafi-jihadist groups like the Somalia-based AS exploit porous borders to recruit among unemployed youth, offering salaries to fighters a direct consequence of the state’s absence in providing security or livelihoods (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2025). With TIRA controlling less than 30% of Tigray’s territory and federal forces refusing to disarm hostile militias, the region approaches de facto partition along ethnic lines, foreclosing meaningful reintegration into Ethiopia (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2025).
4.3. Economic Collapse: Systemic Annihilation
Tigray’s economy lies in ruins, with the World Bank (2025) estimating $22.6 billion in physical destruction and $6 billion in lost GDP since 2020 equivalent to 150 years of regional budgets. Agricultural collapse is irreversible in key zones: Eritrean troops deliberately demolished 78% of irrigation canals in the fertile Humera lowlands, while Amhara militias seeded 32,000 hectares with anti-personnel mines to prevent farming (Ecology & Society, 2024; HALO Trust, 2025).
Urban industry evaporated as systematic looting erased manufacturin capacity. Mekelle’s flagship factories Ayder Pharmaceuticals, Mesfin Industrial Engineering, and Tigray Textiles were stripped of machinery sold as scrap metal in Sudan. This eradicated 214,000 formal jobs, creating 85% unemployment in major towns (Tigrai Online, 2025; World Bank Damage Assessment, 2025). The banking freeze imposed by the National Bank of Ethiopia since 2021 has strangled commerce, forcing reliance on barter; a 50kg sack of teff now trades for two goats, reversing monetary economic gains of 30 years (Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2025).
Resource predation sustains the crisis. Federal authorities redirect Tigray’s hydropower (Tekeze Dam) and sesame exports to finance federal projects, while blocking reconstruction funds. Only 3% of the $780 million pledged for recovery at the 2023 Geneva Conference reached Tigray due to federal “coordination fees” and vetoed procurement (UN Development Program, 2025). Meanwhile, inflation exceeds 380% annually for staples salt costs 20x its pre-war price pushing 92% of households into debt bondage (Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 2025).
The collapse has biospheric consequences. Deforestation accelerated as 1.2 million displaced people cut 18 million trees for fuel, degrading 40% of watersheds. Soil erosion from abandoned terraces will reduce future crop yields by 60% even if farming resumes a multi-generational environmental catastrophe (UN Environment Program, 2025). With no credible recovery plan, Tigray’s economy exists only through humanitarian drip-feeding, ensuring permanent fragility (International Food Policy Research Institute, 2025).
4.4. Social Fragmentation: The Unraveling of Society
Tigray’s social fabric has undergone violent atomization, with identity-based hatreds institutionalized by conflict. Ethnic polarization escalated as Amhara media framed Tigrayans as “traitors,” while Tigrayan IDPs in Amhara regions face pogroms 42 massacres documented since 2023 (World Peace Foundation, 2025). Historical narratives are weaponized; Amhara nationalists glorify 19th-century emperor Tewodros II’s massacres in Tigray, while Tigrayan youth commemorate the TPLF’s 1980s famine resistance as justification for secession (Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2025).
Religious schism epitomizes societal rupture. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church’s fracture in 2023 when Tigrayan clergy formed an autocephalous synth after Patriarch Abune Mathias was confined by federal forces left 6 million Tigrayans spiritually adrift. The burning of 127 churches and assassination of 94 priests erased communal spaces for reconciliation (The Guardian, March 2025; African Affairs, 2025).
Youth radicalization accelerates the fragmentation cycle. With 68% of 15–24-year-olds unemployed and 58% exhibiting PTSD, armed groups offer purpose: TPLF splinter factions recruit 3,000 monthly, while Eritrea-backed Salsay Weyane militia lures others with cash. Social media algorithms amplify extremist content Tigrayan TikTok channels glorify TDF martyrs, while 16Amhara platforms call for “final solutions” (Modern Diplomacy, 2025; Stanford Internet Observatory, 2025).
Cultural erasure compounds trauma. The deliberate destruction of Axum’s archaeological archive and looting of 15,000 medieval manuscripts severed links to shared Ethiopian heritage. Traditional conflict resolution through shimagles (elders) collapsed as only 12% of pre-war community leaders survive, annihilating mechanisms for local reconciliation (UNESCO, 2025; Journal of Modern African Studies, 2025). Without intervention, these fractures threaten permanent societal disintegration, transforming Tigray into a patchwork of armed fiefdoms governed by vengeance (United States Institute of Peace, 2025).
5. Regional and International Perspectives on the Tigray Conflict: Expanded Analysis
5.1. Neighboring Actors: Complex Engagements and Shifting Stances
The Tigray conflict profoundly destabilized the Horn of Africa, directly involving neighboring states whose actions significantly shaped their trajectory and regional security. Eritrea’s involvement was particularly pivotal, evolving dramatically over time. Initially, Eritrea provided crucial military support to the Ethiopian federal government, viewing the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as an existential threat due to their unresolved border war and decades of hostility. Eritrean forces were deeply embedded in the conflict, accused of committing widespread atrocities within Tigray (HORN REVIEW 2025). However, Eritrea perceived the Pretoria Agreement (November 2022), which formally ended the major hostilities between the Ethiopian federal government and the TPLF, as a profound betrayal. The agreement largely sidelined Eritrea, failing to address its security concerns or mandate the withdrawal of its forces, leading to Asmara’s deep resentment and a refusal to immediately comply with ceasefire terms, prolonging insecurity in northern Ethiopia (HORN REVIEW 2025).
Sudan played a dual and often contradictory role. On one hand, it hosted hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the violence in Tigray, placing a significant strain on its already fragile resources and economy (Omna Tigray 2023). On the other hand, the conflict exacerbated pre-existing tensions with Ethiopia, primarily centered on the disputed al-Fashaga border region and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Border skirmishes intensified as Ethiopia diverted military resources to Tigray, creating a security vacuum Sudan sought to exploit, further compromising 17regional stability and diverting attention from the humanitarian crisis (Omna Tigray 2023). This complex dynamic highlighted how the conflict amplified pre-existing bilateral disputes.Somalia experienced significant spillover effects, demonstrating the conflict’s regional ramifications. Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops, traditionally part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM/ATMIS), were drawn back into Ethiopia to fight in Tigray. This redeployment created security vacuums exploited by Al-Shabaab. Furthermore, reports emerged of clashes within Somalia between Tigrayan fighters (potentially withdrawing or regrouping) and Ethiopian AU peacekeepers, adding another layer of complexity and violence to Somalia’s own fragile security situation (Wikipedia 2024). The conflict thus directly impacted the counter-terrorism efforts in Somalia.
5.2. International Responses: Inconsistent Engagement and Strategic Interests
The international response to the Tigray conflict was marked by inconsistent engagement, limited leverage, and the prioritization of strategic interests over consistent humanitarian or human rights principles. The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) were central to diplomatic efforts, successfully brokering the initial humanitarian truce in March 2022 and the pivotal cessation of hostilities agreement in Pretoria in November 2022. However, both bodies demonstrably lacked the political will or effective mechanisms to enforce compliance with their own agreements. Ceasefire violations, particularly involving Eritrean forces and Amhara regional militias, persisted with impunity, and unimpeded humanitarian access remained elusive long after the agreements were signed, highlighting the limitations of diplomatic initiatives without robust enforcement (Various reports on implementation gaps, 2022-2024).
Human rights organizations consistently condemned the international community’s tepid response to the scale of atrocities. Amnesty International, in a scathing 2021 report, highlighted war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by all parties but reserved criticism for the “tepid” and ineffective reaction from global powers, arguing that the lack of decisive action, such as targeted sanctions or arms embargoes, effectively enabled the continuation of abuses (Amnesty International 2021). This perceived inaction fueled accusations of double standards in the application of international law.
The United States, a major donor of humanitarian aid, faced significant criticism for its inconsistent diplomatic approach. While providing vital assistance and initially imposing sanctions 18(later lifted), its stance was perceived as fluctuating, often prioritizing broader strategic concerns like counter-terrorism cooperation in Somalia and regional stability over consistently pressuring all belligerents, particularly Ethiopia’s federal government and Eritrea, to halt atrocities and allow unfettered aid access (Analysis of US diplomatic shifts, 2021-2024). Meanwhile, regional powers like Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pursued clear strategic objectives. Both nations supplied armed drones to the Ethiopian federal government, directly impacting the conflict’s military balance, while simultaneously leveraging the situation to secure lucrative economic deals, particularly regarding port access and infrastructure projects in Ethiopia, demonstrating how geopolitical and economic interests often superseded conflict resolution or humanitarian imperatives (The Washington Post 2025).
5.3. Geopolitical Shifts: Realignment and Enduring Instability
The Tigray conflict acted as a catalyst for significant geopolitical realignments within the volatile Horn of Africa, redrawing alliance structures and exacerbating existing tensions. The most dramatic shift occurred in the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Their wartime alliance, forged against a common TPLF enemy, collapsed spectacularly following the Pretoria Agreement. Eritrea felt abandoned and its security concerns ignored by Ethiopia, leading to a rapid deterioration in relations. Asmara viewed the agreement as an Ethiopian betrayal that left the TPLF potentially resurgent, souring ties and leaving Eritrea isolated and resentful, a major source of ongoing instability (HORN REVIEW 2025).
Simultaneously, other external actors capitalized on the vacuum and shifting alliances. Turkey emerged as a significant beneficiary, dramatically expanding its influence in the Horn. By supplying armed drones to Ethiopia and potentially other actors, Ankara secured valuable military contracts and deepened its strategic footprint. This military cooperation was complemented by ambitious economic ventures, positioning Turkey as a key player in the region’s future, often in competition with traditional powers and Gulf states (HORN REVIEW 2025, The Washington Post 2025).
The conflict thus accelerated Turkey’s regional ascendancy.
The enduring legacy of the conflict is a region teetering on the brink of wider conflagration. Deepseated animosities, unresolved border disputes (especially between Ethiopia and Sudan, and Sudan and Ethiopia over al-Fashaga/GERD), the continued presence of Eritrean forces in Ethiopia (despite Pretoria), and the proliferation of armed groups have created a tinderbox. Analysts consistently warn of the persistent and high risk of a broader regional war, potentially drawing in 19Eritrea, Sudan, and Ethiopia directly against each other, or involving their respective proxies (Institute for the Study of War 2025). Such a conflict would have devastating humanitarian consequences and pose a severe threat to the security of critical Red Sea shipping lanes, vital for global trade, underscoring how the Tigray conflict’s fallout continues to endanger the entire region and beyond (Institute for the Study of War 2025).
6. Paths Forward for Post-Conflict Tigray: An Expanded Analysis
6.1. Political Reconciliation: Building Legitimate and Sustainable Governance
Achieving lasting peace in Tigray hinges fundamentally on genuine political reconciliation, which requires moving beyond the fragile ceasefire towards inclusive governance and addressing the deep-seated grievances fueling the conflict. The cornerstone remains the full and faithful implementation of the Pretoria Agreement (CoHA), particularly its provisions on power-sharing and territorial administration. This necessitates not only the demobilization of Tigrayan forces but crucially, the establishment of a truly inclusive interim regional administration that incorporates diverse political voices from Tigray, including marginalized groups beyond the TPLF, ensuring broad-based legitimacy and participation in the transition (Carnegie Endowment 2023). Internal unity within the Tigrayan political landscape is paramount; fragmented TPLF factions must overcome internal divisions and present a coherent platform for negotiation and governance, preventing exploitable fractures that could derail the process and undermine Tigray’s collective bargaining position (Carnegie Endowment 2023).
A critical element of restoring trust is the unambiguous restoration of Tigray’s pre-war constitutional autonomy. The Ethiopian federal government must demonstrably reverse the de facto annexation of Western Tigray by Amhara forces and the militarization of Southern Tigray, allowing the Tigray Interim Administration genuine authority over its territory as defined by the Ethiopian constitution prior to November 2020. This involves the withdrawal of all non-ENDF forces, particularly Eritrean troops and Amhara regional militias, whose continued presence directly violates the Pretoria Agreement and perpetuates instability and human rights abuses, fundamentally blocking reconciliation (Carnegie Endowment 2023; Reports from Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) & OHCHT, 2021-2024). Meaningful political dialogue must address the underlying causes of the conflict, including historical marginalization, disputes over 20federalism, and the nature of Ethiopia’s multinational state, requiring sustained commitment from Addis Ababa to negotiate core constitutional issues rather than impose solutions.
Establishing a credible and comprehensive transitional justice mechanism is non-negotiable for societal healing and accountability. As emphasized by international observers, this requires a hybrid approach involving both national and international components to ensure impartiality and effectiveness. Specialized courts, potentially established with international technical assistance and oversight, are essential to prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, regardless of affiliation, countering the pervasive culture of impunity (The Guardian 2024; International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) Reports, 2022-2023). Parallel truth-seeking processes, such as a well-resourced and independent truth commission, are vital to establish a shared historical record of atrocities, acknowledge victims’ suffering, identify systemic failures, and recommend institutional reforms to prevent recurrence, providing a foundation for societal reconciliation beyond purely legal accountability (The Guardian 2024; African Union Transitional Justice Policy Framework).
6.2. Economic Recovery: Rebuilding Foundations for Livelihoods and Dignity
The scale of economic devastation in Tigray demands an unprecedented, coordinated, and wellfunded recovery effort focused on restoring basic services, livelihoods, and long-term resilience. The World Bank’s Resilient Recovery Framework (2023-2028) provides a crucial blueprint, prioritizing the reconstruction of utterly devastated critical infrastructure including hospitals, schools, roads, bridges, power grids, and telecommunications networks destroyed at an estimated rate exceeding 90% in many areas, which is fundamental for any other recovery activity to succeed (World Bank 2025; UNOCHA Damage Assessments, 2023). Revitalizing agriculture, the backbone of Tigray’s economy supporting over 80% of the population, is equally urgent; this requires massive inputs of seeds, fertilizer, tools, and draught animals, alongside rehabilitation of irrigation schemes and soil conservation structures damaged by conflict and deliberate destruction, to enable the next planting seasons and avert prolonged famine (World Bank 2025; FAO Tigray Emergency Response Plans).
Immediate livelihood support programs are essential to prevent further destitution and displacement. Successful pilot projects, such as the World Food Program (WFP) initiative supporting 2,000 farmers with inputs and cash grants, demonstrate effective models that can be rapidly scaled to reach hundreds of thousands, providing families with the means to restart productive activities and regain self-sufficiency (WFP 2025 Progress Report). Similar programs are needed for displaced urban populations, traders, and skilled workers, combining cash-for-work, vocational training, and microfinance to stimulate local markets and reduce dependency on humanitarian aid. Funding this vast recovery requires exceptional measures: significant debt relief for Ethiopia to free up national resources, coupled with large-scale, multi-year grants from international donors specifically earmarked for Tigray’s reconstruction, avoiding diversion to other federal priorities (International Monetary Fund (IMF) Debt Sustainability Analyses; Donor Pledging Conference Statements, 2023-2024).
Rebuilding shattered social service systems, particularly health and education, is a cornerstone of human recovery and future stability. Health infrastructure requires not only physical reconstruction but also restocking of essential medicines, re-establishment of supply chains, and urgent recruitment and training of health workers, addressing the exodus caused by the conflict and restoring basic and specialized care, including mental health services for widespread trauma (WHO Tigray Health Cluster Bulletins). Similarly, rehabilitating schools, providing learning materials, and supporting teachers are vital to restore education for a generation of children who have missed years of schooling, preventing long-term developmental setbacks and societal fractures. Investment in these sectors must be viewed not as charity but as an essential investment in human capital and future social stability.
6.3. Social Cohesion: Mending Social Fabric and Rebuilding Trust
The conflict inflicted profound societal wounds, fracturing communities along ethnic, political, and geographical lines, and eroding centuries-old social bonds; rebuilding social cohesion is therefore as critical as physical reconstruction. Community-led dialogue processes, facilitated by trusted local elders, religious leaders, and civil society organizations, are essential to address localized grievances, foster mutual understanding of shared suffering, and initiate grassroots reconciliation at the village and neighborhood level, creating safe spaces for acknowledging harm and beginning forgiveness processes (Pilot Dialogue Assessments by Inter-peace & local NGOs, 2024). These initiatives must be culturally sensitive, inclusive of women and youth, and designed to address the specific traumas experienced by different groups, including survivors of sexual violence, former combatants, and the displaced.
Deliberate efforts to preserve and restore Tigray’s rich cultural heritage, deliberately targeted during the conflict, play a vital role in healing collective trauma and reinforcing identity. Projects 22like the community-driven restoration of rock-hewn churches in North Shoa demonstrate how safeguarding historical sites can foster local pride, create shared purpose, and serve as tangible symbols of resilience and continuity amidst destruction, providing psychological anchors for communities (Nature 2022, “Cultural Heritage as a Catalyst for Post-Conflict Healing: Lessons from North Shoa”). Documenting oral histories, reviving traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and supporting cultural expressions (music, art, religious festivals) are equally important for processing collective grief and rebuilding a sense of normalcy and shared identity.
Engaging the large and influential Tigrayan diaspora is crucial for leveraging resources and advocacy. Structured diaspora engagement programs, coordinated by the interim administration and international partners like Pact, can channel significant financial remittances beyond family support into targeted community rebuilding projects (schools, clinics, small businesses) through transparent mechanisms like diaspora bonds or matched funding schemes (Pact 2025, “Harnessing Diaspora Capital for Post-Conflict Reconstruction”). Beyond finances, the diaspora provides invaluable skills transfer (medical, engineering, education), international advocacy to maintain global attention on Tigray’s needs and the imperative for accountability, and psychological support networks for those rebuilding lives within Tigray, forming a vital bridge between the homeland and the global community.
6.4. International Cooperation: Sustained Pressure, Support, and Accountability
The international community has an indispensable, albeit complex, role in supporting Tigray’s path forward, requiring sustained engagement, principled conditionality, and a commitment to justice. The African Union (AU) must move beyond brokering agreements to actively leading and enforcing their implementation, particularly ensuring the complete and verifiable withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Ethiopian territory, a persistent violation undermining peace. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) needs to demonstrate greater resolve, utilizing its mechanisms for sanctions and political pressure more effectively, and working closely with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to maintain regional consensus on compliance (AU PSC Communiqués on Ethiopia; IGAD Summit Declarations).
International donors, while providing essential humanitarian and recovery assistance, must apply consistent and principled conditionality. Aid flows, particularly budgetary support to the Ethiopian federal government, should be explicitly contingent on demonstrable progress: ensuring unimpeded, sustained, and predictable humanitarian access to all parts of Tigray (currently still obstructed in key areas), full cooperation with independent human rights investigations, and concrete steps towards implementing the Pretoria Agreement, including Eritrea’s withdrawal and restoration of Tigray’s pre-war administrative boundaries (Joint Donor Statements; UN Security Council Briefings on Humanitarian Access). This leverage is crucial to counter obstructionism and prioritize civilian needs.
Finally, ensuring accountability for atrocity crimes is fundamental for deterring future violations and achieving genuine reconciliation. While national mechanisms are preferable, their independence and capacity remain deeply questionable given the political context. Therefore, robust international involvement is essential. As argued by bodies like the American Society of International Law (ASIL), support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) – potentially through a UN Security Council referral given Ethiopia’s non-member status or the establishment of a dedicated international or hybrid tribunal, is necessary to credibly investigate and prosecute senior officials and commanders from all parties responsible for the most serious crimes (ASIL 2025, “Pathways to Justice for Atrocity Crimes in Tigray”). Without credible accountability, the cycle of violence and impunity in the Horn of Africa is likely to continue, jeopardizing not only Tigray’s fragile peace but the stability of the entire region.
ConclusionI.
The Roots of Fragmentation and the Scale of DevastationTigray’s profound fragmentation is not an isolated phenomenon but the direct consequence of Ethiopia’s decades-long, unresolved struggle between competing visions of statehood: ethnic federalism, designed to accommodate diversity through regional autonomy, versus centralized control seeking a unitary national identity.
This fundamental tension, embedded in the 1995 constitution but never fully resolved politically, created fertile ground for the catastrophic conflict when centralizing forces under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed perceived the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the dominant force in Tigray and former core of the ruling coalition, as an obstacle to their vision (Aalen 2024, The Contradictions of Ethiopian Federalism). This internal fault line was dangerously exacerbated by external interference, most critically Eritrea’s deepseated hostility towards the TPLF and its decisive military intervention, alongside the strategic opportunism of regional actors like the UAE and Turkey, transforming an internal political crisis into a regionalized war with genocidal dimensions (International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE) 2023 Final Report; de Waal 2023, The Political Marketplace in the Horn of Africa). Layered upon this are centuries of complex historical grievances, contested territorial claims (particularly Western Tigray), and narratives of marginalization or dominance, which were weaponized during the conflict, deepening societal fractures to an unprecedented degree (Tronvoll & Schaefer 2023, The Tigray War: Colonial Echoes and Modern Atrocities).
The aftermath of the two-year war presents a landscape of almost unimaginable ruin, demanding a response commensurate with the scale of destruction. Governance vacuums persist, with the Tigray Interim Administration struggling to establish authority amidst the continued presence of hostile forces (Eritrean troops, Amhara militias) in significant territories and the shattered remnants of local administration (Carnegie Endowment 2024, The Precarious Tigray Interim Administration). Economic infrastructure lies in ruins, with systematic destruction targeting hospitals, schools, factories, farms, and communication networks, pushing an estimated 90% of the population into dependence on humanitarian aid and reversing decades of development progress (World Bank 2024, Tigray Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment; UNOCHA 2024, Tigray Humanitarian Needs Overview). Most profound, however, is the societal trauma: widespread experiences of massacres, sexual violence used as a weapon of war, torture, forced displacement, and starvation have inflicted deep psychological wounds on individuals and shattered the social fabric of communities, creating a legacy of pain and mistrust that will span generations (Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch, multiple reports 2021-2024; MSF 2023, The Invisible Wounds of Tigray).
II. Formidable Challenges and Fleeting Opportunities
The path towards recovery is strewn with formidable, potentially insurmountable, obstacles. Internally, deep factionalism within the TPLF and broader Tigrayan political elite threatens to paralyze the Interim Administration and could easily spark renewed internal conflict or prevent a unified front in negotiations with Addis Ababa, undermining the fragile Pretoria Agreement (International Crisis Group 2024, Tigray’s Political Fractures: A Risk to Peace). The specter of famine looms large once more, driven not only by the immediate destruction of harvests and assets but by the systemic collapse of markets, trade routes, and agricultural systems, compounded by persistent bureaucratic obstacles and insecurity hindering aid delivery, creating a real risk of mass25starvation recurring in 2024-2025 (FEWS NET 2024, Ethiopia Food Security Outlook; WFP/FAO 2024, Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Tigray). Regionally, Eritrea’s unabated belligerence remains the single greatest threat; President Isaias Afwerki’s regime views any form of stable or autonomous Tigray as an existential threat, actively undermining the peace process, refusing to withdraw troops, and potentially provoking wider regional conflict involving Sudan and Ethiopia over border disputes and Red Sea access, posing an existential danger to stability across the Horn (Institute for the Study of War (ISW) 2024, Eritrea’s Spoiler Role in the Horn of Africa; HORN REVIEW 2024, Asmara’s End Game in Tigray).
Despite the overwhelming challenges, critical opportunities for stabilization and recovery exist, demanding urgent and skillful leveraging. Extraordinary local resilience is evident amidst the ruins, with communities self-organizing for mutual aid, initiating local reconciliation dialogues, and attempting to restart agricultural production with minimal resources, demonstrating a foundational will to rebuild that external actors must support, not supplant (Research interviews with local NGOs, Mekelle University 2024; Nature 2023, Community Resilience Mechanisms in Conflict Zones). The vast and highly skilled Tigrayan diaspora represents an unparalleled reservoir of expertise, financial capital, and international advocacy potential; structured programs to channel remittances into reconstruction, facilitate skills transfer in critical sectors (health, engineering, governance), and maintain global political pressure for accountability and aid access are essential and underutilized assets (Pact 2024, Diaspora Engagement Toolkit for Post-Conflict Settings; World Bank 2023, Diaspora Financing Mechanisms for Fragile States). Furthermore, the Pretoria Agreement (CoHA), despite its flaws and implementation failures, remains the only existing internationally recognized framework for peace. Revitalizing its core tenets – withdrawal of foreign forces, restoration of pre-war constitutional arrangements, unhindered aid access, and a credible transitional justice process – through sustained, high-level diplomatic pressure led by the African Union, with robust international backing, offers the most viable, albeit precarious, roadmap out of the current impasse (Carnegie Endowment 2024; US/EU Diplomatic Briefs on Tigray Implementation, 2024).
III. The Imperative for Inclusive Politics, Equity, and Sustained Global Commitment
Tigray’s future viability hinges precariously on the establishment of genuinely inclusive politics within the region and a fundamental renegotiation of its relationship with the Ethiopian state. Power structures in Tigray must move beyond TPLF dominance to incorporate a wider spectrum 26of political voices, civil society, women, youth, and traditional leaders, ensuring that governance reflects the needs and aspirations of all Tigrayans, not just competing elite factions (UNDP 2023, Assessment of Governance Needs in Post-Conflict Tigray). Crucially, this must be matched by Addis Ababa’s unequivocal commitment to equitable resource sharing, the restoration of Tigray’s constitutional autonomy including control over its territory and finances, and a sincere national dialogue addressing the core contradictions of Ethiopian federalism that precipitated the conflict. Without a demonstrable shift towards power-sharing and fiscal equity at the federal level, Tigray’s forced reintegration will only breed further resentment and instability (Aalen & Tronvoll 2024, Ethiopia After Tigray: Federalism at a Crossroads; International IDEA 2023, Constitutional Dialogue Options for Ethiopia).
The international community must move beyond reactive humanitarian funding to an unwavering, principled, and strategically coordinated long-term commitment. Aid, particularly budget support to the Ethiopian government, must be strictly conditioned on verifiable progress: the complete withdrawal of Eritrean forces, unimpeded humanitarian access throughout Tigray, credible steps towards restoring Tigray’s pre-war administrative boundaries, and concrete cooperation with independent human rights investigations and transitional justice processes (Joint Statement by Major Donors to Ethiopia, April 2024; ASIL 2024, Conditionality and Accountability in Post Conflict Aid). Simultaneously, sustained diplomatic pressure, potentially including targeted sanctions against spoilers of the peace process, is essential to counter obstructionism and uphold the Pretoria framework. Global attention must not waver as new crises emerge; the stakes extend far beyond Tigray. Failure to secure a just and sustainable peace risks hardening the current fragmentation into permanent disintegration.
This could manifest as a de facto independent but crippled and unstable Tigray, perpetual low-intensity insurgency, or trigger the violent unravelling of Ethiopia itself along its many ethnic and regional fault lines, plunging the strategically vital Horn of Africa into decades of further conflict, mass displacement, and humanitarian catastrophe, with profound global repercussions (International Crisis Group 2024, Preventing Ethiopia’s Collapse; Institute for the Study of War (ISW) 2024, Red Sea Security Implications of Ethiopian Fragmentation; Menkhaus 2023, Horn of Africa: The Cascading Risks of State Failure).
References
Aalen, L. (2006). Ethnic Federalism and Self-Determination for Nationalities in a SemiAuthoritarian State: The Case of Ethiopia. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 13(2–3), 243–261.Aalen, L. (2011). The Politics of Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Actors, Power and Mobilization under Ethnic Federalism. Brill.Aalen, L. (2024). The Contradictions of Ethiopian Federalism: From Promise to Peril. Journal of Modern African Studies.Aalen, L. & Tronvoll, K. (2024). Ethiopia After Tigray: Federalism at a Crossroads. Chr. Michelsen Institute Report.Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnic-Based Federalism and Ethnicity in Ethiopia: Reassessing the Experiment After 20 Years. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5 (4), 596–618.Abbink, J. (2011). Ethnicity and conflict generation in Ethiopia: Some problems and prospects of ethno-regional federalism. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 29 (4), 369-388.Addis Standard. (2025). Tigray at Crossroads: Factionalism, Governance Paralysis and Looming Risk of Civil War. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://addisstandard.comAfrica Center. (2025). Rising Tensions in Tigray. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://africacenter.orgAfrican Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) Communiqués & IGAD Summit Declarations. (2022–2025).Al Jazeera. (2021, July 5). Egypt, Sudan could support Tigray rebels against Ethiopia: Report. https://www.aljazeera.com/Amnesty International. (2021). Ethiopia: Tepid International Response to Tigray Conflict Fuels Horrific Violations. May 18, 2021. https://www.amnesty.orgAmnesty International. (2021). Ethiopia: Wave of atrocities in Tigray must spur international action. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/02/ethiopia-wave-of-atrocities-in-tigraymust-spur-international-action/28Amnesty International. (2021). ‘I don’t know if they realized I was a person’: Rape and sexual violence in the conflict in Tigray. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/ethiopiatroops-and-allied-militias-rape-women-and-girls-in-tigray-conflict/Amnesty International & Human Rights Watch. (2021–2024). Reports on Atrocities in Tigray. Amnesty/HRW Publications.AP News. (2023, June 14). UN says Ethiopia’s Tigray at ‘extreme risk’ of famine, calls for urgent aid access. https://apnews.com/AP News. (2025). Ethiopia’s Tigray Region Faces Deepening Hunger Crisis. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://apnews.comArmed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). (2023). Ethiopia: Six months after the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. https://acleddata.com/Bahru Zewde. (2002). A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855–1991. Ohio University Press.BBC. (2023, March 15). Ethiopia’s Tigray war: Survey ‘suggests 600,000 killed’. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-64965705Berhe, M. G. (2020). A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilisation in Ethiopia. Tsehai Publishers.Binns, J. A. (2017). The Orthodox Church of Ethiopia: A History. I.B. Tauris.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2023). The Pretoria Agreement: A Fragile Peace for Ethiopia.Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2024). The Precarious Tigray Interim Administration: Challenges of Governance and Legitimacy. Carnegie Report.Clapham, C. (1988). Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia. Cambridge University Press.Connah, G. (2015). African Civilizations: An Archaeological Perspective (3rd ed.). Cambridge University Press.Conflict and Health. (2023). Special Issue: Health and Social Impacts of the Tigray Conflict. 17 (Suppl 1).Crisis Group. (2009). Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.orgCrummey, D. (2000). Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Century. James Currey.29de Waal, A. (2018). The Future of Ethiopia: Developmental State or Political Marketplace? World Peace Foundation.de Waal, A. (2021). The Political Marketplace in the Horn of Africa: The Tigray War in Context. World Peace Foundation Report.de Waal, A. (2021). The political marketplace and the end of the Ethiopian transition. World Peace Foundation, Tufts University. https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/Devex. (2022, January 28). Famine is ‘knocking on the door’ in Ethiopia’s Tigray, UN warns. https://www.devex.com/Education Cluster Ethiopia. (2024). Tigray Education in Emergencies: Annual Report 2023. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-education-cluster-annual-report-2023Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) & Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2021–2024). Joint Investigation Reports and Updates on Tigray.Ethiopia Insight. (2024, January 15). Western Tigray remains under Amhara control despite the Pretoria deal. https://www.ethiopia-insight.com/Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). (2024). *Ethiopia Food Security Outlook: January – September 2024*. FEWS NET Report.Fattovich, R. (2010). The Development of Ancient States in the Northern Horn of Africa, c. 3000 BC–AD 1000: An Archaeological Outline. Journal of World Prehistory, 23 (3), 145–175.Fegley, R. (2021). A History of Tigray. Harrassowitz Verlag.Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2022). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Tigray Region, Ethiopia. https://www.fao.org/Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2023–2024). Tigray Emergency Response Plans and Crop Assessments.Foreign Policy. (2023, January 12). How Iranian Drones Are Transforming Ethiopia’s Civil War. https://foreignpolicy.com/Hagmann, T., & Abbink, J. (2011). Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 2011. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 5 (4), 579-595.30Hammond, L. (2024). Displacement in the Tigray War: Fragmentation, Survival and the Search for Home. James Currey.HORN REVIEW. (2024). Asmara’s End Game in Tigray: Regional Hegemony and Regime Survival. HORN REVIEW Analysis.HORN REVIEW. (2025). Shifting Sands: Eritrea’s Betrayal and the New Horn Order After Pretoria.Human Rights Watch (HRW). (2020). Ethiopia: Unlawful Shelling of Tigray Urban Areas. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/14/ethiopia-unlawful-shelling-tigray-urban-areasHuman Rights Watch (HRW). (2021). Ethiopia: Eritrean Forces Massacre Tigray Civilians. https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/05/ethiopia-eritrean-forces-massacre-tigray-civiliansHuman Rights Watch (HRW). (2021). ‘We Will Erase You from This Land’: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia’s Western Tigray Zone. https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/06/we-will-erase-you-land/crimes-against-humanity-andethnic-cleansing-ethiopiasHuman Rights Watch (HRW). (2022). Ethiopia: Ethnic Cleansing Persists Under Tigray Truce. https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/04/06/ethnic-cleansing-persists-under-tigray-truce/ethiopiaInstitute for the Study of War (ISW). (2024). Eritrea’s Spoiler Role in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea Security Implications of Ethiopian Fragmentation. ISW Assessments.Institute for the Study of War. (2025). Red Sea Tinderbox: Assessing the Risk of Regional War in the Horn of Africa.Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). (2021). Ethiopia: Acute Food Insecurity Situation March – May 2021 and Projection for June – September 2021. https://www.ipcinfo.org/Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC). (2023). Ethiopia: Acute Food Insecurity Analysis (Tigray, Amhara, Afar). https://www.ipcinfo.org/Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Summit Declarations. (2022–2025).Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2024). Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024: Ethiopia Country Profile. https://www.internal-displacement.org/International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE). (2022–2023). Reports to the UN Human Rights Council. UN Docs A/HRC/50/CRP.1, A/HRC/54/CRP.2.31International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE). (2023). Final Report to the UN Human Rights Council. UN Doc A/HRC/54/CRP.2.International Crisis Group (ICG). (2009). Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents. Africa Report No. 153.International Crisis Group (ICG). (2020). Ethiopia’s Transition: A New Dawn? Africa Briefing No. 152.International Crisis Group (ICG). (2021). Ethiopia’s Tigray War: A Deadly, Dangerous Stalemate. Africa Report No. 311. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/311-ethiopiastigray-war-deadly-dangerous-stalemateInternational Crisis Group (ICG). (2021). Finding a Path to Peace in Ethiopia’s Tigray Crisis. Accessed June 19, 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.orgInternational Crisis Group (ICG). (2023). Salvaging Ethiopia’s Fragile Peace Deal. Africa Report No. 317. https://www.crisisgroup.org/International Crisis Group (ICG). (2024). Ethiopia’s Tigray Region: Picking Up the Pieces After War. Africa Briefing No. 198.International Crisis Group (ICG). (2024). Tigray’s Political Fractures: A Risk to Peace and Preventing Ethiopia’s Collapse. ICG Briefings.International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). (2023). Constitutional Dialogue Options for Ethiopia: Pathways from Crisis. IDEA Report.International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2023–2024). Ethiopia: Staff Reports for Article IV Consultations and Debt Sustainability Analyses.International Organization for Migration (IOM). (2023). Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) Ethiopia: Tigray Region Report – Round 12. https://dtm.iom.int/ethiopiaInternational Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT). (2024). The Invisible Wounds of War: Assessing Torture and Trauma Needs in Tigray. https://irct.org/Interpeace / Local NGOs. (2024). Assessing Community Dialogue Needs for Reconciliation in Post-Conflict Tigray. Pilot Project Reports. [Placeholder].Iyob, R. (2000). The Ethiopian Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs. Hegemonic States in the Horn of Adisplaced
