Mekelle,Nairobi,Pretoria,London,March 11፡2025 (Tigray Herald)
Personal reflection on Tsadkan’s Article
By solomon Dawit
I do not believe war is imminent, at least not in the near future. The Saudi-Egypt-Eritrea-Trump alliance primarily serves as a blocking factor against a potential war and Addis Ababa’s port ambitions. While I acknowledge that Ethiopia’s long term need for port access is inevitable, this is not an immediate concern.
That said, I agree with Tsadkan on two key points. First, if war does break out, it will be catastrophic, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa as we know it. Second, Eritrea will likely attempt to drag Tigray into the conflict.
I hope Tigray avoids becoming a battleground and that TPLF generals recognize, in time, that the people of Tigray will never approve of an alliance with the Eritrean army. However, proxy hostilities are likely to intensify. If Eritrea enjoys the support of Saudi Arabia and secures Assab with a Gulf presence, it will be in a stronger position to focus on arming insurgencies against Addis Ababa, much like it did during the EPRDF era.
As for Ethiopia’s federal government, time will tell how it responds. However, if Saudi Arabia takes control of Assab, the UAE will likely lose interest in Ethiopia, as this would effectively end any of its ambitions for Red Sea control due to the the diminished prospect of Ethiopia’s access to the sea. UAE military support for Ethiopia to counter Saudi and Etitrea is unlikely to continue given the likelihood of Trump and Egypt directly and Saudi indirectly will be pressuring the UAE to back off.
If Saudi Arabia’s presence in Assab becomes a reality, it will likely have U.S. approval, or at least a lack of opposition from Washington. The U.S. would be reluctant to challenge Saudi Arabia out of fear that Eritrea might grant Russia access to its ports. (Recall the visit of Russian naval officials to Eritrean ports, which I believe was a subtle threat from Isaias, signaling that Eritrea could align with Russia if the U.S. pressures it over war crimes in Tigray and other issues.)
Furthermore, Trump is a known ally of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia (remember the $600 billion pledge from the Saudi crown prince to Trump). The U.S. and Israel also have strategic interests in supporting Egypt, which is currently at odds with Ethiopia over the Nile Dam. As a result, Trump is unlikely to back Addis Ababa due to conflicts of interest.
The Arab League and the U.S. could also pressure the UAE, as they have done before. Notably, the U.S. pressured the UAE out of Assab seven years ago to appease Saudi Arabia, and the UAE ultimately complied. It is therefore unlikely that the UAE would resist similar pressures again.
For Tigray, the concern is that TPLF flirting with Eritrea would anger the Federal on top its frustration over possible Assab ambition challenges. This would mean the federal gov’t will be coming like a wounded beast on TPLF which would ironically bring a war in Tigray, even if the Assab issue is shelved. Thus the challenge for Tigray is not just Ethio-Eritrea port war, but the unwise desperate moves of TPLF faction. This would not only kill pretoria, Tigray will pay immensely for no apparent political forseeble objective. And sadly TPLF is too good at failing to see its way ahead of intime, as it did in the last 50 years.
Of course, this all is just my personal prediction and I could be wrong.
