Mekelle፡Telaviv, Nairobi, Pretoria, London, (Tigray Herald).
Port of Assab, Proxy Wars, and the Ben Gurion Canal: Ethiopia’s Strategic Role in the Red Sea
By Habtamu Gurmu
The strategic waters of the Red Sea are once again at the center of an evolving global chessboard. At the heart of it lies Ethiopia a landlocked but geopolitically indispensable player whose ambitions in the Horn of Africa intersect with a new proposed waterway: the Ben Gurion Canal. This Israeli-led project, supported by the United States, aims to rival Egypt’s Suez Canal and reshape maritime logistics across the Middle East and East Africa. Ethiopia’s potential involvement represents a significant pivot, tying together national interests in trade diversification, geopolitical rivalry, and strategic security concerns.
Ethiopia’s Sea Access Dilemma
Since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, Ethiopia has remained landlocked, conducting more than 95% of its maritime trade through Djibouti. This dependency has created economic vulnerabilities and constrained Ethiopia’s strategic options. Recent efforts, such as the 2023 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland for access to the Berbera port, underscore Ethiopia’s desire to break this maritime bottleneck. The renewed interest in the Port of Assab historically contentious and symbolically loaded signals Ethiopia’s willingness to assert itself more forcefully in the region’s trade routes and naval politics.
The Ben Gurion Canal: A Strategic Game-Changer
The proposed Ben Gurion Canal, which would cut through southern Israel from Eilat on the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, holds transformative potential. Beyond offering an alternative to Egypt’s Suez Canal, it symbolizes a broader strategic alignment: one in which Israel, the United States, and potentially Ethiopia coordinate to establish a new corridor for trade, security, and influence.
For Ethiopia, this collaboration is multi-layered. Economically, the canal offers an alternative gateway to the global market. Politically, it strengthens Ethiopia’s hand in its protracted dispute with Egypt over the Nile waters and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt, which relies on the Nile for over 90% of its freshwater and controls the Suez Canal, has long leveraged its maritime position and diplomatic weight to counter Ethiopian ambitions.
Aligning with Israel and the U.S. on a rival canal project would not only diversify Ethiopia’s trade options but could also serve as a diplomatic counterbalance to Egyptian pressure. It transforms Ethiopia from a passive recipient of port access deals into a stakeholder in a new transregional infrastructure.
Security Architecture and Proxy Alignments
The Red Sea, particularly the Bab al-Mandab Strait, is one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints facilitating nearly 12% of global trade. It is also a hotspot for instability, with piracy off Somalia’s coast, Houthi disruptions from Yemen, and broader regional power rivalries.
Ethiopia has emerged as a central security player in the region, contributing troops to African Union peacekeeping missions and maintaining robust defense ties with Western partners. Its involvement in the canal project could formalize its maritime security role, aligning its defense architecture more closely with the U.S. and Israel who both maintain military assets in Djibouti and Eritrea.
This partnership also counters the growing influence of China and Russia. China’s military base in Djibouti and its control of the Doraleh port form part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aimed at securing global supply chains and resource corridors. Russia’s naval expansion in Sudan and military cooperation with Eritrea add another layer of competition. An Ethiopia-Israel-U.S. alliance centered on the canal would offer the West a critical counterweight in the Horn.
The Port of Assab: Revival and Realignment
The reemergence of the Port of Assab in geopolitical discourse is no coincidence. Once a key Ethiopian outlet before the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, Assab has become a pawn in a larger struggle for maritime access and influence. Recent reports of increased U.S. and Israeli engagement with Eritrea potentially as part of the canal strategy have raised eyebrows, especially given Eritrea’s historical isolation and authoritarian governance.
For Ethiopia, reopening dialogue around Assab is both a necessity and a risk. Engaging Eritrea could grant logistical advantages but would require navigating a complex web of mistrust, historical wounds, and shifting alliances not least with the controversial Eritrean role in the recent Tigray conflict.
Risks and Roadblocks
Despite the promise, the Ben Gurion Canal project is fraught with challenges. Technically, carving a 300-kilometer canal through arid Israeli terrain is a monumental task. Politically, it risks provoking Egypt, whose economic and strategic interests are deeply tied to the Suez Canal. A hardened Egyptian stance could intensify its opposition to the GERD or lead to regional escalations.
For Ethiopia, aligning with Western powers may also alienate other traditional partners, such as China, and could entangle the nation in proxy rivalries it cannot control. Domestically, the government must also manage the optics of partnering with controversial regional actors, particularly given sensitivities around Eritrea and Israel.
Conclusion: Ethiopia’s Strategic Bet
Ethiopia’s interest in the Ben Gurion Canal is more than a search for sea access it is a bold strategic calculation. By embedding itself in a high-stakes regional infrastructure project, Ethiopia aims to break economic constraints, shift diplomatic leverage, and carve a more assertive role in the Red Sea’s security architecture.
Whether this gamble will pay off depends on the execution of the canal, the durability of geopolitical alignments, and Ethiopia’s ability to navigate the diplomatic crosscurrents of the Red Sea and the broader Middle East. One thing is clear: the Horn of Africa is no longer a peripheral region it is a central arena in the 21st-century contest for trade, influence, and security.
