Mekelle፡Telaviv, Nairobi, Pretoria, London, (Tigray Herald)
The Perpetual Conflict in Tigray: A Comprehensive Historical and Political Analysis.
By Gidey Gebreegziabher
1.Introduction
The Tigray region, nestled in the rugged highlands of northern Ethiopia, has long been a crucible of power, culture, and conflict. Its historical significance stretches back to the Aksumite Empire, one of Africa’s great ancient civilizations, where Tigray served as the political and economic heartland. Yet, despite this illustrious past, modern Tigray has been defined by cycles of marginalization, resistance, and violence.
The region’s story is one of resilience in the face of external domination, internal fragmentation, and repeated betrayals by its own leadership.This article seeks to unravel the complex tapestry of Tigray’s history, examining how centuries of conflict have shaped its present predicament.
From the decline of Aksum to the brutal Tigray War of 2020–2022, each era has left deep scars on the region’s social, political, and economic fabric. Beyond mere chronology, this analysis explores the recurring failures of Tigrayan political leadership, the stark divide between elite ambitions and popular aspirations, and the destructive role played by external actors particularly Eritrea in Tigray’s suffering.
The recent deregistration of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) by Ethiopia’s National Electoral Board (NEBE) marks a symbolic end to an era, but it also raises urgent questions about what comes next. Will new political movements emerge to fill the void, or will Tigray descend into further instability?
Can reconciliation with the Ethiopian state be achieved, or will the wounds of war fester into renewed conflict? By examining these dynamics, this article aims to provide a deeper understanding of why Tigray remains trapped in a cycle of violence and what might finally break it.
- Historical Conflicts in Tigray
A. Post-Aksumite Period (9th–12th Century): Decline and Fragmentation
The fall of the Aksumite Empire in the 9th century marked the beginning of Tigray’s long decline from imperial center to fractured periphery. Once a hub of transcontinental trade and Christian civilization, Tigray faced devastating invasions by the Beja and other nomadic groups, which shattered its centralized authority.
The collapse of Aksum’s maritime trade routes further isolated the region, crippling its economy and leaving it vulnerable to warlordism. Competing noble families and regional chieftains fought for dominance, but without a unifying force, Tigray became a patchwork of feuding fiefdoms.Historical accounts, such as those by Munro-Hay (1991), describe how this fragmentation made Tigray easy prey for stronger neighbors.
The region’s inability to coalesce into a cohesive political entity set a pattern that would repeat for centuries: brief periods of resurgence followed by collapse, as internal divisions and external pressures eroded Tigray’s autonomy.
B. Zagwe Dynasty (12th–13th Century): Political Marginalization
The rise of the Zagwe dynasty in the 12th century deepened Tigray’s marginalization. Though the Zagwe rulers claimed continuity with Aksumite traditions, they deliberately sidelined Tigrayan elites, shifting Ethiopia’s political center southward to Lasta (modern-day Wollo). The construction of the rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, while a marvel of medieval architecture, symbolized Tigray’s diminishing influence.
Taddesse Tamrat (1972) notes that this exclusion fueled resentment and periodic rebellions, but without a unified leadership, Tigray remained politically impotent. The Zagwe era reinforced the region’s status as a peripheral player rather than a core actor in Ethiopian politics—a theme that would persist under subsequent dynasties.
C. Ahmad Gragn’s Invasion (16th Century):
Destruction and ResistanceThe 16th-century jihad of Imam Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (Ahmed Gragn) was one of the most catastrophic events in Tigray’s history. His forces targeted Tigray as a stronghold of Ethiopian Christianity, burning churches, slaughtering clergy, and looting religious treasures.
Pankhurst (1997) documents how entire towns were raised, leading to mass displacement and economic collapse.Despite fierce resistance from Tigrayan warriors, the invasion inflicted long-term demographic and cultural damage. Recovery was slow, and the trauma of Gragn’s campaign lingered in Tigrayan collective memory, reinforcing a siege mentality that would later shape the region’s political identity.
D. Zemene Mesafint (Era of Princes, 18th–19th Century): Feudal Anarchy
The Zemene Mesafint was a period of near-total political disintegration, where warlords like Ras Mikael Sehul ruled through brute force rather than legitimacy. Tigrayan nobles spent more time fighting each other than resisting external threats, preventing the emergence of a unified leadership.
Bahru Zewde (2001) highlights how this infighting left Tigray vulnerable to domination by emerging powers from Shewa, including Emperor Tewodros II.This era exemplified Tigray’s recurring curse: a lack of cohesive leadership that left the region exposed to exploitation. The constant power struggles among Tigrayan elites foreshadowed the factionalism that would later plague the TPLF.
E. Emperor Tewodros II (1855–1868):
Centralization and RepressionTewodros II sought to reunify Ethiopia under a strong central government, but his brutal campaigns in Tigray alienated the region. His forces crushed local resistance, executed rival leaders, and imposed harsh rule. Rubenson (1966) argues that Tewodros’s authoritarian methods deepened Tigray’s distrust of centralized power, a sentiment that would later fuel separatist movements.
F. Emperor Yohannes IV (1872–1889): Tigrayan Leadership Under Siege
Yohannes IV, a Tigrayan emperor, prioritized defending Ethiopia against foreign invasions (Egyptians, Italians, and Mahdists). His reign briefly restored Tigray’s prominence, but his death in battle against the Mahdists in 1889 marked the end of Tigrayan dominance.
Marcus (1995) contends that Yohannes’s failure to secure a stable succession allowed Shewan elites, particularly Menelik II, to shift Ethiopia’s political center southward, marginalizing Tigray once more.
G. Menelik II and Haile Selassie (1889–1974): Systematic Marginalization
Under Menelik II and Haile Selassie, Tigray was deliberately sidelined.Clapham (1969) describes how Haile Selassie’s centralization policies stripped Tigray of its autonomy, replacing local leaders with appointed loyalists. This marginalization stoked Tigrayan nationalism, laying the groundwork for future rebellions.
H. The Derg Regime (1974–1991): Famine and Armed Resistance
The Marxist Derg regime intensified repression in Tigray, culminating in the devastating 1983–1985 famine, which the regime weaponized by blocking aid (de Waal, 1991). This brutality fueled the rise of the TPLF, whose guerrilla warfare eventually helped topple the Derg in 1991.
I. TPLF/EPRDF Rule (1991–2018): From Liberation to Authoritarianism
After 1991, the TPLF dominated Ethiopia through the EPRDF coalition. Initially, Tigray benefited from federalism, but the TPLF grew increasingly corrupt and autocratic (Vaughan, 2011). Its overthrow in 2018 set the stage for the catastrophic Tigray War.
J. Prosperity Party and the Tigray War (2020–2022): Genocide and Humanitarian Crisis
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s sidelining of the TPLF led to an open war in 2020. Eritrea’s involvement escalated the conflict into ethnic cleansing, with massacres, sexual violence, and starvation tactics documented by HRW (2022) and the UN (2021).The war left Tigray in ruins, with millions displaced and thousands of dead.
- Why Has Tigrayan Political Leadership Repeatedly Failed?
Tigray’s political leadership has historically struggled due to internal fragmentation, authoritarian tendencies, and strategic miscalculations.During the Zemene Mesafint (“Era of the Princes”), rival warlords undermined regional unity through constant infighting, preventing the emergence of a cohesive Tigrayan front.
The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), despite initially championing self-determination and development, later succumbed to corruption and centralized control. Its dominance alienated ordinary Tigrayans, who grew disillusioned with its authoritarian governance.
The TPLF’s critical failure came after 2018, when it misjudged Ethiopia’s shifting political landscape. Rather than negotiating for Tigray’s interests within a reformed federal system, the leadership chose confrontation with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, triggering a catastrophic war that devastated the region.
This pattern of poor decision-making rooted in elite self-preservation rather than public welfarehas left Tigray politically weakened and vulnerable to external domination.
Interests of the Tigrayan People vs. Political Elites
There is a stark divide between the priorities of Tigray’s general population and its political elites. For ordinary Tigrayans, the key concerns are security, economic recovery, cultural preservation, and meaningful autonomy within Ethiopia. The devastation of the 2020–2022 war has left deep scars, with communities prioritizing reconstruction, justice for war crimes, and protection from future violence.
In contrast, Tigray’s political elites particularly within the TPLF have historically focused on maintaining power, controlling economic resources, and leveraging Tigrayan nationalism for survival. This disconnect has led to policies that benefit a small ruling class rather than addressing the needs of farmers, traders, and displaced families.
The result is a crisis of legitimacy, where Tigrayan leaders claim to represent their people but repeatedly pursue strategies that deepen suffering rather than alleviate it.
Eritrea’s Role in the Tigray Genocide: Motives and Consequences
Eritrea’s involvement in the Tigray conflict was driven by President Isaias Afwerki’s long-standing vendetta against the TPLF, rooted in the bitter 1998–2000 border war. His alliance with Abiy Ahmed provided Eritrea an opportunity to exact revenge, with Eritrean forces committing mass atrocities including executions, systematic rape, and the deliberate blockade of food aid (UN, 2021).
The objective was not merely military victory but the destruction of Tigrayan resistance, ensuring the TPLF could never regain influence.
Eritrea’s intervention prolonged the war, worsened humanitarian suffering, and entrenched Tigray’s distrust of external actors. The long-term consequences include a traumatized population and a geopolitical landscape where Tigray remains vulnerable to Eritrean aggression.
The NEBE Decision and the Future of the TPLF
The National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) effectively ended the TPLF’s legal existence in 2023 by deregistering it for failing to meet re-registration requirements. This decision was framed as administrative but carried deep political implications, solidifying the Prosperity Party’s dominance after the Tigray War.
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The Pretoria Agreement (2022) mandated the TPLF’s disarmament but left its political fate unresolved. With its armed wing (the Tigray Defense Forces) disbanded and its leadership marginalized, the TPLF now struggles to remain relevant. Some members may attempt rebranding, while others could fade into obscurity. This marks a dramatic fall for a party that once ruled Ethiopia and underscores the federal government’s success in sidelining a historic rival.
The Opportunity to Rise of New Political Forces in Tigray
As the TPLF fades, new political movements are emerging in Tigray, reshaping the region’s future. Hardline factions like the Tigray Independence Party (TIP) and reformist groups such as Arena, Salsay Weyane Tigray (SaWeT), Baytona, Asimba, Wejerat Sirat Kanchi 20 Adi, Aksumay Wa’ela and others are gaining traction, capitalizing on public frustration with both the TPLF’s wartime failures and federal overreach.
These groups differ in ideology some push for greater autonomy within Ethiopia, while others openly advocate for independence. Meanwhile, the federal government is promoting PP-aligned Tigrayan elites to consolidate control, raising questions about whether Tigray’s politics will remain defiant or be co-opted by Addis Ababa.
The Interim Tigray Administration, installed post-war, remains weak, leaving a power vacuum that these competing factions aim to fill. The coming years will determine whether Tigrayan politics fragments further or unites under a new, cohesive movement.
Tigray’s Uncertain Future: Resistance or Reconciliation?
Tigray stands at a crossroads. If the federal government continues to delay reconstruction, ignore war crimes, and suppress autonomy demands, the region could see renewed resistance whether through protests or armed rebellion. Conversely, if moderate factions negotiate a power-sharing agreement, Tigray might achieve stability under a decentralized system.
International actors, including the African Union and Western donors, could influence this outcome by pressuring Ethiopia toward accountability.
Ultimately, Tigray’s future hinges on two factors:
The resilience of its people demands self-determination and justice. Whether Addis Ababa chooses coercion or compromise in dealing with the region.
The TPLF’s erasure is not the end it is the beginning of a volatile new chapter in Tigrayan politics.
Conclusion፡
Tigray’s history is a tapestry of resilience, conflict, and unfulfilled potential. From the decline of the Aksumite Empire to the devastating Tigray War of 2020–2022, the region has endured cycles of marginalization, repression, and violence.
The failures of Tigrayan political leadership marked by fragmentation, authoritarianism, and strategic missteps have exacerbated these challenges, leaving the population vulnerable to external domination and internal strife.
The recent erasure of the TPLF from Ethiopia’s political landscape marks a pivotal moment. While this opens space for new political movements, it also risks further instability if Tigray’s core grievances delayed reconstruction, unaddressed war crimes, and demands for self-rule remain unresolved.
The region stands at a crossroads: one path leads to renewed conflict fueled by federal intransigence and grassroots defiance, while the other offers the possibility of reconciliation through inclusive governance and genuine autonomy.
Recommendations፡ For the Ethiopian Federal Government
Prioritizing reconstruction and humanitarian aid should be a top agenda. The government must expedite the delivery of aid to Tigray, addressing urgent issues such as famine, displacement, and the destruction of infrastructure.
A collaborative approach with international organizations would be essential in ensuring transparency and accountability in resource allocation, fostering trust among affected communities.Justice and accountability must also be pursued.
Supporting independent investigations into atrocities committed during the Tigray War—including Eritrean involvement can pave the way for reconciliation and healing. Holding perpetrators accountable is critical to fostering trust and preventing future conflict.A sustainable political settlement requires genuine dialogue.
Engaging with moderate Tigrayan factions to negotiate a power-sharing agreement that grants meaningful autonomy could be a constructive step forward. The government must also avoid coercive centralization policies that risk reigniting conflict and deepening divisions.
For Tigrayan Political Actors
Unity behind a common vision is crucial for the region’s stability. Emerging political forces should prioritize the welfare of Tigrayans over factional interests, working toward a cohesive strategy for engagement with the federal government.
Whether advocating for autonomy or independence, a united front will strengthen their position in negotiations.Tigrayan leaders must also reject authoritarianism and corruption. Learning from the failures of the TPLF and embracing transparency, inclusivity, and democratic governance could help restore credibility and trust among the people. A governance model rooted in accountability will serve the long-term interests of the region.
For the International Community
Diplomatic and humanitarian pressure should be sustained. The African Union and Western donors have a responsibility to advocate for accountability and inclusive dialogue in Ethiopia. Conditioning aid and diplomatic support on progress toward peace and justice could incentivize meaningful action from stakeholders.
The role of Eritrea must also be closely monitored. The international community should exert pressure to ensure Eritrea withdraws its military presence from Tigray and ceases destabilizing actions. Such measures could contribute to lasting peace and regional stability.
For Civil Society and the Tigrayan People
Grassroots voices must be amplified. Documenting and advocating for Tigray’s needs is essential in ensuring local perspectives shape policy decisions. Civil society can play a pivotal role in elevating concerns and demands to both national and international forums.
Inter-ethnic dialogue should be promoted to mitigate polarization.Creating platforms for inclusive discussions between communities could help bridge divides and foster understanding. Social cohesion will be instrumental in preventing future conflict and strengthening the foundation for peace.
Final Thoughts
Tigray’s future hinges on breaking the cycle of conflict through justice, inclusivity, and shared prosperity. The federal government must choose compromise over coercion, while Tigrayan leaders must prioritize unity and pragmatism.
The international community’s role is critical in ensuring accountability and supporting peacebuilding. Without these steps, Tigray risks remaining trapped in its history of perpetual conflict a fate its resilient people do not deserve.
So, the choice is clear: REPEAT THE PAST OR FORGE A NEW PATH.
Reference፡
- Addis Standard: TPLF Loses Legal Recognition (2023)
- Bahru Zewde (2001)A History of Modern Ethiopia.
- Clapham, C. (1969). Haile Selassie’s Government.
- de Waal, A. (1991). Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia.
- HRW (2022). “We Will Erase You from This Land”: Crimes Against Humanity in Ethiopia.
- Marcus, H. (1995). The Life and Times of Menelik II.
- Munro-Hay, S. (1991). Aksum: An African Civilization of Late Antiquity.
- National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) Announcement (2023)
- Pankhurst, R. (1997). The Ethiopian Borderlands.
- Taddesse Tamrat (1972). Church and State in Ethiopia.
- UN (2021). Report on the Tigray Conflict.
- Vaughan, S. (2011). The TPLF: Reform or Decline?
Gidey Gebreegziabher is a Tigrean Scholar. He is PHD Candidate in Archaeology at the University of Warsaw, Poland.
