Who Gained and Lost in the Tigray Regional Coup?

Mekelle፡Telaviv, Nairobi, Pretoria, London,April 12፡2025 (Tigray Herald)

Who Gained and Lost in the Tigray Regional Coup?

  1. Introduction

After the end of the genocidal war in Tigray, Getachew Reda was appointed as the interim president to lead the region. From the beginning, the old guard of the TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front) was displeased and openly opposed his leadership. Why? There were three key reasons:

  1. The Pretoria Agreement: The old guard accused the negotiators of overstepping their mandate during the Pretoria Agreement. They preferred rejecting the peace deal and returning to war. However, this plan collapsed due to widespread opposition from the Tigrayan people.
  2. Power and Legacy: The TPLF has historically been led by a small group of individuals from one geographic area. They viewed the appointment of a leader outside their inner circle as a threat to their dominance. Not only were political leaders from this group but military commanders as well—treating Tigray almost as their private enterprise.
  3. Fear of Accountability: Many former political and military leaders were involved in corruption, illegal mining, and human trafficking. They feared that a new, independent judicial system could hold them accountable—hence their resistance to democratic reforms and transparent governance.
  4. The Coup

The interim administration was overthrown through a coordinated effort between the TPLF old guard and certain Tigrayan military commanders. The coup began with the disruption of governance structures at the district (woreda) and zonal levels, including in the capital, Mekelle. It was supported by senior military figures and the then vice president, General Tadesse Werede.

Surprisingly, the federal government did not release any official statement condemning the coup. Instead, it effectively endorsed the old guard’s proposal by appointing their nominee as the new leader.

  1. Why Did the Federal Government Support General Tadesse?

Although General Tadesse was part of the coup, many analysts believe the federal government supported him for strategic reasons:

• Agreement Ties:

Tadesse was one of the signatories of the Kenyan military agreement and maintained both public and secret dialogues with the federal government. After Getachew and General Tsadkan, he became increasingly influential and frequently met with Ethiopian Defense Force officials.

• A Compromise Candidate:

The old guard backed Tadesse, and the federal government accepted him to avoid further political turbulence. Tadesse himself was eager to assume leadership and even worked to undermine decisions made by the interim administration.

• Balance of Power:

As a seasoned military leader with deep knowledge of the internal dynamics of the TPLF and regional issues, Tadesse was seen as a figure who could balance competing interests—at least temporarily.

  1. Winners and Losers in the Political Power Struggle

Winners:

• The Federal Government:

o Strategic Victory: By avoiding direct conflict, the federal government maintained peace and earned diplomatic credit.

o Exposure of the Old Guard: The coup revealed the old TPLF leaders’ rejection of the Pretoria Agreement and their links to foreign actors pushing for renewed war.

o Divide and Rule:

The removal of reformists like Getachew Reda and General Tsadkan fragmented the Tigrayan political landscape, working to the federal government’s advantage.

o Gradual Accountability: Rather than confronting the military en masse, the government is selectively holding individuals accountable—neutralizing threats without sparking backlash.

Neutral Outcomes:

• Getachew Reda and the Interim Administration:

o Media War:

Despite the old guard’s hate-fueled propaganda—especially through platforms like Dedebit—the interim administration maintained relative calm through public outreach.

o Democratic Gains:

Though late, the interim administration initiated democratic reforms, including forming a regional council that exposed the old guard’s corruption and anti-democratic tendencies.

o Public Awareness:

The people of Tigray began distinguishing between party and government, reducing the TPLF’s traditional grip.

o Peaceful Exit: Despite assassination attempts, Getachew chose not to mobilize supporters for conflict. His peaceful departure avoided bloodshed and preserved his historical standing.
Losers:

• General Tadesse Werede:

o Once a respected military commander, his reputation has suffered due to his role in the coup.

o He is now perceived as power-hungry and overly loyal to the old guard, disappointing those who expected him to retire with dignity.
o He signed binding and controversial agreements with the federal government, many of which had previously been wisely handled under Getachew. But now, the old guard will use it to expose him and return to power.

o He lacks the administrative and diplomatic skills required to lead equitably and will likely struggle against the manipulative tendencies of the old guard.

• The Old TPLF Guard:

o They failed to take responsibility for the devastation caused by the war, including genocide, war crimes, and the destruction of Tigrayan lives, though mostly exci=uted by ENDF, Amhara milia and ENF, but the old guard leadership was not in a position to maintain TDF’s courageous and intensity by supplying enough logistics.

o Their actions—especially organizing a coup—have further divided the region and stained Tigrayan history.

o Despite resisting reforms like the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration), they now have to implement them.

o Their relentless pursuit of power shows they are more concerned with control than rebuilding Tigray’s institutions or future.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The federal government has emerged as the political victor and will likely continue asserting dominance over Tigray—thanks in part to the dysfunction within the TPLF.

General Tadesse may attempt to serve the old guard’s interests, but their greed and lust for power will limit his success. The question of reclaiming Tigrayan territory remains uncertain, and the loss of political leverage over generations has left Tigray vulnerable.
Recommendations:

  1. Continue resisting the influence of the old guard and expose their undemocratic actions.
  2. Rebuild truly independent institutions in Tigray to ensure justice, accountability, and fair governance.
  3. Empower younger, reform-minded leaders to take charge of Tigray’s political future.
  4. Seek unity among Tigrayan political actors to regain negotiation power and address regional challenges effectively.

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