The Geopolitics of the Red Sea
• and stability” of the Red Sea; (underlying motives of interference; meticulous analysis of timely information on agendas behind “covert” and overt activities).
• Global powers: United States; Russia; China; Japan; France..
• Regional powers: Iran, Turkiye, Israel
• Terrorism (in all its forms)
• Pirates
• Human Traffickers
• Illegal Arms Dealers
• Drug Dealers
• Environmental pollution
• Devising a roadmap and strategic plan on the basis of the objective appraisal and monitoring of information.
• Ensuring coherence and complementarity of the strategic plan with Eritrea’s “neighborhood/regional policy”.
• It is imperative for the countries, located in the sensitive segment of the Red Sea and its environs especially, to possess their own sovereign and effective defense and security institutions in general and potent defense and naval forces in particular as a mandatory task.
• Somalia to come out of the 30-year-long spiral of stalemate and crises and build its own effective institutions. Any substitute must be avoided and not contemplated.
• Yemen’s case: similar to that of Somalia.
• Djibouti to extricate itself from debilitating dependency to build and operate its own national institutions.
• Eritrea to build and possess its own effective institutions.
• Considering its advantages, Saudi Arabia contributes to the collective efforts.
• All the above-mentioned countries ought to be engaged to foster consensus and formulate the requisite legal framework for a joint mechanism so as to eventually shoulder their commitments.
• All the above-mentioned countries will need to establish a “command and control” Coordinating Committee (information sharing, joint exercises . . . etc.)to create synergy through complementarity of their respective resources.
• All the above-mentioned countries will need to work jointly to create a platform for cooperation with willing partners on a mission or task that is beyond their capabilities and that warrants “external” assistance on the basis of common consent.
• Needless to emphasize, attaining this level of effectiveness and cooperation will require time as well as very heavy and tireless endeavours.
• Beyond these fundamental principles and operational mechanisms, Eritrea is not prepared to contemplate involvement in certain activities hastily or through some prodding. Avoiding acrimonious platforms has indeed remained an appropriate historical choice that we have opted for.
Eritrean ministry of informatio,Asmara
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