Mekelle፡ 4 July 2024 (Tigray Herald)
THE NEED FOR A CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM TO SALVAGE FANO
As far back as July 2023, I warned you that if Fano is Managed Properly, it can be the Hope for Ethiopia’s Transformation. If it is not managed properly, it runs two risks. If it gets strong and marches toward Addis, it can ignite an Oromo-Amhara civil war. If it fails to march toward Addis, it will give birth to warlordism. I was right for the umpteenth time. You, esteemed members of the hermitized intellectual class were wrong for the umptnth time.
Below is Section III of my Proposed Fano Manifesto. It is a cut and paste operation. DO not waste your time writing a new manifesto. Cut and paste the following.
III. Fano’s Current Realities: Challenges, Prospects & Next Steps
To date, Fano has registered phenomenal military milestones. The size of its all-volunteer fighters has swollen, rivaling in number the government’s military forces. It has successfully repelled repeated government offensives. It has defeated government forces in many fronts and captured significant light and heavy weapons. Most of the rural areas and small cities in the Amhara tribal land are under Fano control.
No doubt that its successful military achievements has forced the government to stop government-led displacements in the Oromo tribal land. A planned displacement program in Nazareth (a city the Oromo-PP led government calls Adama) has been temporarily halted.
No one forgets Shimelis’ threat on the record that “no power on earth or heaven will stop his government from demolishing the said 600 churches and mosques.” Fano has forced him from going ahead with his threat. The demolition project has been temporarily halted.
Despite phenomenal milestones that Fano has crossed, a closer examination of current realities reveals critical fault lines that have prohibited it from reaching higher milestones. This is attributable to the lack of unity of purpose across the disparate Fano forces.
At the core of this problem is the failure to develop a common political agenda and strategy along with a clear and unified end goal with concomitant roadmap that is adoptive to dynamic changes.
As a matter of practical necessity, Fano leaders need to pay heed to the fact that, in and of itself, having morally, and politically justified cause for an armed uprising does not lead to a political victory. This is so because military strength is a necessary condition for political victory, not a sufficient one. Strategic alignment across the movement’s political and military domains is imperative to ensure all cylinders are firing in a coordinated fashion.
The danger with the current situation is that the movement can reach a tipping point on the military front, while critical political variables lag behind both in terms of establishing national political consensus and a unified leadership architecture.
The military tipping point may be precipitated by the collapse of the government, owing to economic meltdown. It may also be triggered by mass desertion of Amhara militia and special forces in protest of escalating government atrocities against civilians.
Misalignment between political and military strategies and operations can potentially lead to serious consequences. Chief among them is the risk of civil war. Even worse, the threat of warlordism within Fano forces cannot be ruled out.
Why have Fano leaders failed to form an all-inclusive political agenda and a robust and unified Fano political architecture? The problem is attributable to four sources of contention
First, some Fano leaders refute the need for a Fano manifesto that lays out the movement’s political agenda, strategy, roadmap, and end game. They rally behind “መነሻችን አማራ፣ መድረሻችን ኢትዮጵያ” slogan that means everything and nothing at the same time. Its loose translation is: “We start with Amhara and end up with Ethiopia”.
Second, some Fano groups are vehement that there is no victory short of removing the Oromo-PP led government, while others believe that if certain conditions are met a negotiated settlement is the most viable and least costly way forward.
Third, there are differences in opinion about the timing of forming a coalition with forces outside of the Amhara tribal land. Some groups work with the belief that such a broad coalition can wait until Fano achieves victory. Others believe such a coalition must be formed as a matter of urgency.
Fourth, there is the universal political source of contention: Power Struggle. Power struggle is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself. It is also unavoidable. What is important is making such power-centered conflicts manageable. Power contentions are manageable if there is an agreed upon consensus political agenda, strategy, roadmap, and end goal. This is explained in section III.5. below.
Fano’s powerbase is the people of Amhara. Its military operation cannot rely solely on grievances against government atrocities. It requires a political roadmap and clear end goal to inspire the people’s confidence and sustain their support.
It is time for the Fano enterprise and its support ecosystem to pause, reflect, retrospect and take a mid-course correction to bring its political and military means into balance. In this regard, the issues need to be addressed with absolute urgency.
III.1. The Need for a Fano Manifesto
The political space cannot be governed without a political agenda, concomitant strategy, and a robust roadmap. The above-noted political slogan “መነሻችን አማራ መድረሻችን ኢትዮጵያ” is not a substitute for a strategic political manifesto. There is disagreement on what “መነሻችን አማራ” means. The meaning of “መድረሻችን ኢትዮጵያ” is even more contentious.
For example, as noted above, some Amhara groups are open for a negotiated settlement. Others are adamant about overthrowing the government. Which Amhara is “መነሻችን?” Furthermore, there are Ethiopians who swear by the current Constitution. In the meantime, there are others who see the Constitution as the source of the nation’s political cancer. Which Ethiopia is መድረሻችን?
There are two primary reasons behind the failure to develop a unifying manifesto. On the one hand there are some within the Fano enterprise who believe the focus should be on the military front. They see political dialogues and debates as a distraction. On the other hand, there are extremist forces who stand in the way of developing consensus and push their stealth agenda behind a vaguely constructed slogan.
The first problem is a relatively easy one to solve by delegating the task to a council of experts with repute, proven prudence, and strategic vision. This will free Fano leaders to focus on the military domain without distraction. The second problem is harder to crack because of extremist forces standing in the way of a consensus political agenda and strategy that will undermine their extremist agenda.
Who are Amharas extremists? They are an off-grid and high-bandwidth network of activists who aim to dial back the time when the Amhara played a dominant role in state politics. The network’s doctrine coalesces around Amhara nationalism at its nucleus from whence a unitary mindset radiates outward and expresses itself as a national identity.
The network has neither a written manifesto nor an organizational platform. Instead, it pushes a passive-aggressive strategy to take the Ethiopian political center stage, using grievance politics both as the power cylinder and transmission belt of its political machinery.
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That is why they say their political agenda is to stop the governments genocidal war against Amhara and this is a universally accepted agenda across the Amhara tribal land. But this is disingenuous because the political agenda is not only to stop a genocidal threat but also to bring about political change. The form and substance of the change need to be discussed to develop a consensus agenda and strategy.
III.2. The Need for a Clear End Game
The current war between the government and Fano signifies a grim situation characterized by a glaring mismatch between desired outcomes and hard realities. On the one hand, the government’s war is not guided by a military strategy or political logic. Rather, it is driven by a narcissist cum psychopathic Prime Minister who is driven by Oromummaa and relies on fake evangelist prophets who assure him of a divine victory.
On the other hand, the sad reality is that Fano’s military offensive is stalled or at the very least lost its initial momentum. This is due in part to the fact that the military uprising is conducted in a political vacuum. The dynamic interaction of such a reality in the face of a reckless Prime Minister is highly likely to degenerate into a destructive state of entropic chaos from which neither the government nor Fano can emerge as a strategic winner.
What Does Political and Military Victory Mean? Fano needs to define its strategic political and military end goals. Is it a change of government that involves abolishing the Oromo-PP led political leadership? If so, what is entailed? Unseating the Prime Minister or also dissolving the Parliament and overhauling the Constitution?
Is a change of governance acceptable, if institutional guardrails are created to reign in the Prime Minister’s God-like omnipotence and satanic malevolence? If so, what are the preconditions? The substance of these questions has significant bearing on the success of achieving Fano’s desired goal of ending Oromummaa’s drive for Oromo hegemony.
The same extremist forces who are against developing a consensus manifesto are against pursuing a clear and consensus-based end goal. Their goal is unseating the Prime Minister, dissolving the Parliament, and overhauling the Constitution. They know this will not win the support of a large segment of the people of Ethiopia. Rather than making the merits of their case and winning the confidence and support, they aim to achieve their goal by force.
III.3. The Urgent Need for a Coalition with Non-Amhara Forces
The thinking that Amhara will form a broad-based coalition after it takes power is wrongheaded for two reasons. First, the road to success is shorter if a broad coalition is formed. Second, if Amhara does not see the value in listening to, and seeking input from, other tribal homelands before victory, how can it be trusted to form a democratic coalition government after it grabbed the levers of power?
Above all, it is important to realize that Amhara may have the right to make political decisions regarding its tribal homeland. It cannot decide national matters such as removing the government on behalf of others. If it believes overthrowing the government is necessary, it needs a buy-in from opposition forces outside of the Amhara tribal land. Fano leaders cannot assume their agenda, no matter what it may be, is the agenda for all Ethiopians until it is discussed, and consensus is reached.
Ethiopians remember there was the EPRDF (led by Tigrayans), EPRDF 2.0 (led by Oromos) and are not keen to give EPRDF 3.0 (led by Amhara) the benefit of the doubt. The perception that the Oromo, Amhara, and Tigray political class want to dictate their views on others is widely held. This is the time to break that perception and the Fanno Movement must do it both for its own and Ethiopia’s sake.
III.4. The Need to Win the Confidence and Support of the International Community
Its sheer population size and its being the primary target of atrocities makes the Amhara the epicenter of the opposition enterprise around which anti-government forces from all tribal lands can coalesce. This requires winning the confidence and support of non-Amhara forces through an inclusive dialogue and broad consensus building.
The international community understands the Prime Minister is pushing the country into a disastrous civil war and destabilizing the entire Horn of Africa. The Fanno movement must present itself as a nucleus and catalyst for a credible and broad-based opposition.
Fano must show that it has a forward-looking vision anchored in political maturity, diplomatic temperance, and deference to plurality. Its military advances must be guided and restrained by confidence-inspiring political guardrails. This will help it to become a transformative and stabilizing force. In this regard, having a political agenda with a concomitant strategy and robust national and international PR narratives will help it to leverage the international community.
Currently, there are numerous Fano support groups in the diaspora who are representing disparate Fano forces. Each diaspora group approaches the international community with different talking points and conflicting requests for help. The opinion that the US government has about Fano is: It is hard to know who to talk to and what their collective agenda is. This must change immediately.
III.5 The Need to Mitigate Power Struggle Within Fano
Having a unified political agenda along with concomitant strategy, roadmap, and end goal is important to mitigate power struggle for two reasons. First, it will deny power thirsty leaders the opportunity to hide their personal power-driven agenda behind “strategic political and military differences.”
Second, a unified purpose will help to build a critical mass around a common agenda and alienate extremist forces who neither engage in dialogue to persuade others, nor consider an alternative path outside of their view. A consensus-based critical mass will leave them with a choice to either be a part of the common agenda and strategy or get marginalized.
IV. The Chicken-or-Egg Conundrum
The chicken-or-egg is an age-old idiom that describes a sequencing dilemma involving two intertwined issues where each issue’s success depends on the success of the other being done first. There is a misguided belief that the priority is unity in leadership and unity in purpose (political manifesto) can only be achieved after unity in leadership is achieved.
As a result, enormous efforts have been made to bring different Fano leaders together. The efforts of the so-called Concerned Amhara can be mentioned as an example. The effort was not only misguided and a waste of time, but it also ended up being part of the problem. See my articles “The Concerned Amharas are Undermining the Fano Movement” (November 2023).
Unlike the chicken-or-egg conundrum, the Fano problem is not a sequencing problem. It would be intellectually dishonest not to be candid about the failure to establish a robust political architecture to transform the spontaneous Fano uprising into a more organized movement. The problem is with the Amhara intellectual class.
Rather than being opinion leaders and consensus builders, Amhara intellectuals at home and abroad fall into one of the following three groups. The first group has made itself a groupie of one Fano faction or another, thereby becoming part of the problem. The second group is engaged in እድር-ወ-ፅዋ traditional mediation that relies on the science of አንተም ተው አንቺም ተይ doctrine of እርቅ between Fano factions. The third group stands on the sideline as a disinterested spectator.
It is abundantly clear that the primary sources of the problem are some Fano leaders who see themselves as entitled or whose groupies view them as the chosen. Trying to convince them that they are neither entitled nor chosen is a waste of time. It is long past time to have a candid dialogue that is not restricted by the Ethiopian culture of nicety.
V. Some Thoughts on the Way Forward
Unity in Fano leadership and unity in purpose are matters of extreme urgency. The Fano problem is not necessarily a sequencing dilemma. It is not restricted to a binary choice.
The goals of unity in leadership and unity in purpose can be pursued simultaneously. But this requires making sure one will not be a prisoner of the other. For example, if there is a Fano group that insists on being the leader of all Fanos, that group needs to be excluded from the dialogue. The focus should be on those who genuinely want to work together. As time passes, those who were reluctant or outright against a consensus-based unity of purpose and leadership may reconsider their position and join the consensus agenda and strategy.
If unity in Fano leadership and unity in political agenda and strategy cannot be achieved simultaneously, priority must be given to the latter for various reasons. The absence of a unified political agenda and strategy makes it nearly impossible to foster unity in leadership. In contrast, unity in political agenda and strategy can sustain the Fano movement even if there is no unity in leadership, provided open hostility is avoided and different Fano groups operate in their respective lanes. This is a second-best solution.
What do I mean by avoiding open hostility and keeping Fano groups in their respective lanes? It is easier to explain this with an example. Let me first present the lay of the Fano land.
The Amhara tribal land is divided into four regions: Shewa, Wello, Gonder Gojam. In each region, the Fano enterprise is organized in three hierarchical levels: (1) የጎበዝ አለቃ – foundational unit, (2) ብርጌድ – a division consisting of many foundational units, (3) ዕዝ – an amalgamation of divisions to form a command in each of the four regions mentioned above. The fourth and final stage is uniting the four ዕዝs (Commands) to form የአማራ መከላከያ ሃይል – Amhara Defense Force. The problem is at level 3. To date, only Gojam has managed to form ዕዝ – Command.
In Shewa, there are two forces operating independently in different parts of the region. If the two cannot find it possible to join their forces under a common command, the best thing they can do is to carry on their operation in their lane. Problem arises if one of the two unilaterally declares itself to be a regional command. This undermines the other group and may be seen as a hostility move.
Moving forward priority should be given to the following action plan.
1. Build a consensus on the endgame. Is change of government a must? If so, how does Fano mitigate the risk of a civil war? If change of governance is viable, what are the preconditions that the government must meet? This is a thorny issue. It is also the most paramount issue. If success is met in tackling it, it makes the challenge to address the remaining issues less daunting.
2. Establish a minimum common political agenda, layout a strategic, flexible, and adoptive roadmap that will guide the movement to achieve its end goal. It may not be possible to bring every Fano force on board. But a critical mass can be established. Operationally, it is easier to create a critical mass and build on it to bring all Fano forces together, rather than spending energy to bring all leaders to the table in one go, when there are Fano leaders who are gaming the process.
3. Establish a forum to form a broad coalition with all stakeholders inside and outside of the Amhara tribal land. Building a broad consensus on matters of general principles. Restraining from thorny issues and focusing on a minimum common agenda can help to get the ball rolling. This may be done with the help of diaspora support groups and mediation/arbitration facilitators. Success in this area can broaden the national support base and attract the attention of the international community.
4. If establishing a unified Fano front proves unattainable in the short term, then a second-best solution is establishing some binding constraints to refrain Fano leaders from undermining, unduly interfering or conflicting with other Fano groups. The second-best solution can work if there is a common platform with strategic roadmap and a shared end goal.
5. Finally, Fano must deal with the Ethiopian culture of nicety, and candidly and publicly reject those who claim Fano has Manifesto. They are either lying, or do not want to have a consensus Manifesto because they fear it will crowd out their extremist agenda. Or just as likely they have no clue about the paramount importance of the alignment of unity in leadership and unity in purpose. Unity in purpose cannot be achieved without a political agenda and a concomitant strategic roadmap and a clear end game. That is called Manifesto. Manifesto is what presents a group’s vision, mission, direction, and roadmap to win broad confidence and support in the furtherance of its political agenda.
VI. In Conclusion
The Fano movement is the only hope Ethiopia has to stop Oromummaa. This opportunity is being squandered by the intellectual class that has failed to fill an oceanic gap in the opinion leaders’ space. Just like the 1960s generation of intellectuals will be remembered for destroying the country, the current generation of intellectuals will forever be condemned for failing to stop the Oromummaa demons.
Let us dare to be honest. The Oromummaa ideology is architected by some of the world’s most idiotic clowns whose soul is possessed by the demons of the 16th century Mogassa. Sometimes I wonder if God wants to punish the Amhara. Why else would he over-populate the Amhara intellectual class with useful idiots who are outsmarted, outsung, outdanced, and outrun by Oromummaa idiotic clowns whose soul is possessed by the demons of the 16th century Mogassa.
Say what you may but Eskinder and zemene cannot lead Fano.
