Mekelle፡ 20 August 2024 (Tigray Herald)
By Yonas Biru (PHD)
THE ETHIOPIAN POLITICAL CONFESSION CHALLENGE
This challenge is aimed primarily at those who are actively involved in Ethiopia’s political conflicts. Members of the silent majority are also challenged to take part because their silence in the face of their nation’s existential crisis is complacency. The confession challenge starts with my own confession. I then tap or challenge 12 intellectuals and activists to participate by sharing their confession and tapping or challenging 12 others of their choice to do the same. The goal is not to point fingers on others, but to confess our own sins in terms of causing or exacerbating the current crisis.
The 12 people I call up on for the challenge are: Merera Gudina, Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba, Ezekiel Gabissa, Alula Solomon, Daniel Berhane, Professor Getachew Assefa, Alemayehu Fentaw, Andargachew Tsegie, Aklog Birara, Messay Kebede, and Berhanu Abegaz. Notably, I have limited my challenge to four intellectual/activists each from Oromo, Amhara and Tigray tribal homelands because they are the primary forces in the nation’s political conflicts. People who are not named or people outside of the three groups may also participate posting their own confession and challenging others to participate.
We (intellectuals, activists and political junkies) are an integral part of the national political crisis by omission or commission whether our transgressions are misfeasance or malfeasance in nature. If we are to save our people who have become victims of political conflicts that we have become accustomed to brewing and fomenting, we must start with our confession, repentance, and redemption. Thus, shall I stand before God and you my country women and men to confess, repent, redeem, and ask for forgiveness. This does not in any way negate my standing firm to what I believe.
My confession is a bit complicated because it involves two pens: Koki Abesolome and Yonas Biru. I created Koki Abesolome as a pen name in 1991 as a disrupter to expose the inherent flaw in our political, bureaucratic and social cultures. By necessity and intention, she was pushing the envelope to discomfort what she defined as hermitized and tribalized intellectuals. In terms of our current politics, she was an equal-opportunity-offender to the Amhara, Oromo and Tigray political class. As a result, I am seen as an Anti-Amhara, Oromo Phobic, and the Enemy of Tigrayans.
When I created Koki, my hope was to have her stand on her own without invading my space. After 30 years, it is difficult to tell where Koki ends and Yonas Begins. Admittedly, even when I actively sought to silence her tone and polemical style in my articles, I see her influence creeping in. My challenge was to contribute to the political discourse while using her to throw grenade on the tenets of our political culture. The narrative on Axum This, Adwa That and Lalibela ኡኡ, is as much about assailing our detrimental culture as it is about infusing sense into a senseless political landscape.
While admitting Koki’s in-your-face assault may be an overdose to our conservative culture, I still believe her positive contribution is more than the negative baggage she may have brought to bear. Today, it is hard to separate Koki from me or me from her. So, I take responsibility for both.
Let me first say what I sand by unapologetically. I stand by my position on the Tigray war. I believe the war was triggered by TPLF. I still support the federal government’s law enforcement campaign. No country or government would allow a renegade regional government to launch a war against it and brag about confiscating 70% of the nation’s military fire power, including missiles and thanks.
I believed then and still believe now that involving Eritrea was the right decision. It should be noted that TPLF officials and prominent activists such as Daniel Berhane were publicly courting Eritrea to stand with them. From the federal government’s point of view, the choice was to either allow TPLF to use the national weapons it had confiscated by force to overthrow the federal government or use whatever was available to it to stop it. So, inviting the Eritrean forces was the right call that the situation warranted.
It is also worth remembering Eritrea’s military intervention in Ethiopia was not new in Ethiopian politics. During the TPLF’s era, the Eritrean military force was in Ethiopia on the side of TPLF for two years after Eritrea declared its independence. So, the criticism from TPLF supporters and activists about Eritrea’s involvement in the recent war is hypocritic duplicity in steroid laced with psychedelic drugs that distorts a person’s perception of reality.
Where I blame the government is regarding its decision to deteriorate the law enforcement campaign into a civil war and the atrocities committed against civilians in Tigray both by the ENDF and forces that it brought to support it, including Eritrea and Amhara military forces. I have written many articles including those published by international outlets condemning this.
Since November 2020, I have called for a negotiated settlement and allowing access to unfettered international investigations of all atrocities committed by ENDF, Amhara, Eritrea and TDF forces. In my opinion designating TPLF as a terrorist organization was wrong. So was the government’s drive to dismantle TPLF as a political entity. My four proposals for ending the war published in November 2020, June 2021, June 2022 and November 2022 reiterated all these points.
I also stand by my many nuanced articles on Political Oromummaa that differentiated cultural and political Oromummaa. The same is true about my coining the term Amhara-Shene and ringing the bell of sirening the seeds of destructive impulses in the womb of Amhara extremism. I not only stand by my principled positions I believe that current facts on the ground have exonerated me assessment.
My Confession
I was an unreserved and vocal supporter of Prime Minister Abiy until April 6, 2019 — his first anniversary. I believed then and I still believe that his initial economic reforms were right, his resistance against both tribal and unitary forces and his cautionary policies of gradual political reform was also right on the money. After his first anniversary, I turned into a reserved supporter while criticizing him and his policies where needed. I directed my criticism both publicly and through his office.
It was in February 2022 I started to criticize him without holding back. During the war, I supported his administration where he needed to be supported and criticized him when I felt necessary. In retrospect, I see that my support was lauder and more frequent and my criticisms were more subdued and far in between.
My introspective expedition over the last several months has helped me to revisit the past with a new lens that time has cleared. Looking back, there were signals that show the tale-tell of a psychopath in the person of the Prime Minister. Speaking of election conflicts, he said “elections conflicts may lead to the death of tens or even hundreds of people. But soon after it will be forgotten, and life would go on.” His nonchalant description of the death (murder of hundreds of people) was a window in his psychopathic mind.
At the time his statement did not sit well with me. But the exuberance of euphoria and TPLF’s irrefutable intransigence with “my-way or the highway” attitude weighed in my political calculus. This is no excuse because as an intellectual, I should have risen above the euphoric exuberance.
In the process of writing this article I went through many of my published articles. There are no articles I wrote about, TPLF, Amhara Fano, Amhara Shene, Oromo-Shene, Oromummaa that I regret in tone or tenor. I understand that many of them may be too much for our conservative culture. Our culture sugarcoats the bad and the ugly. My intent was not only to show the ugly truth but also to lay it bear. For that I do not apologize.
There are, however, several articles I published between November 2000 and the January 2022 about the PM that I regret and would rewrite. The problem in my articles was that in the interest of protecting Ethiopia from Amhara- and Oromo-Shene and TPLF, I spared the Prime Minister from the kind of harsh and objective treatment that I reserved for extremist forces.
With the benefit of time, I now believe the extremism in Amhara, Oromo and Tigray are no more dangerous than his psychopathic impulses. I cannot deny my contribution to the creation of one of the worst and most dangerous psychopath to consolidate power. For that I feel both regretful and accountable.
On June 28, 2018, I wrote the below analysis under the by-line of Koki Abesolome. In the article, I divided government supporters and critics into three clusters each. I warned the need to rein in cluster one of each group.
I wish I listened to myself. My failure to do so led me to be part of the problem rather than a champion of what I outlined as a solution. I find it difficult to forgive myself for helping entrench a psychopath than seeking forgiveness from others.
THE TENSION BETWEEN RAGING EUPHORIA AND DEEP-ROOED FEAR IN ETHIOPIAN POLITICS
Koki Abesolome
June 28, 2018
The current change came rather abruptly, taking the people of Ethiopia on both sides of the political divide by surprise. Those who are supporting PM Abiy’s rapid change are people who were longing for change. With the current reform they went from a state of despair to riding a high of euphoria in short order.
On the other hand, those who lost their firm grip on the levers of power went from a privileged political status to a state of dysphoria, as their claim of invincibility gave way to deep-rooted fear. Neither group had time to imagine, contemplate or in any way prepare for the sudden turn of events.
The tug-of-war between the two groups is the most daunting task PM Abiy faces. His ability to manage the euphoria and dispel the fears of the opposition determines his success and place in history as a statesman.
A close examination of those in a euphoric state shows three different groups. I submit that classifying people into distinct clusters is a risky endeavor. There are overlaps across groups and chameleons enter and leave from one cluster to another without notice. Be this as it may, for general analytical purposes we can classify the euphoric group into three clusters.
CLUSTER 1 includes people who want the current reform to rise on the ashes of TPLF and people who supported it. That covers a large swath of the people of Tigray. Their euphoria, fueled by thirst for revenge of 27 years of TPLF atrocities, is matched only by their divisive rhetoric. Among this group are people who spread unsubstantiated (if not totally fabricated) news claiming the late PM Meles is worth $10 billion and his daughter is worth $5billion. They consider every business built by people of Tigryan origin as ill-gotten. They are hell bent to infuse their anti-TPLF campaign into the reform and push the proverbial envelop to include TPLF supporters within the bull’s eye of their target.
CLUSTER 2 consists of people who want the reform to succeed and carry an attitude that it is in the best interest of TPLF to cooperate. They subscribe to PM Abiy’s policy of providing amnesty to former party bosses, provided they are not standing in the way of the reform. Their message to TPLF and their supporters is “Roll with the reform or Get Rolled Over.”
CLUSTER 3, seemingly a small minority including this author, would like to see PM Abiy’s administration to rein in Group 1 and take confidence-building measures to address the worries of reasonable TPLF members and Ethiopians of Tigryan origin. This is different from ጨው ለራስህ ስትል ጣፍጥ attitude espoused by Cluster 2. This requires sustained efforts to bring them into the reform fold. Both TPLF and their supporters are in a state of shock and a sustained effort can mitigate their worries and fears and encourage them to be part of the reform.
Those in a state of dysphoria can also be categorized into three broad Clusters, albeit with due circumspection.
CLUSTER 1 is populated by people who seem to believe TPLF has a divine claim to the levers of power. They believe 27 years of unchallenged and illegitimately held power is not enough. They know the status quo of greater Tigray (including Wolkait and Alamata) and TPLF’s economic empire (EFFORT) cannot be sustained under democratic governance. At bottom, their opposition is not to PM Abiy’s brand of reform. They are against democracy and the rule of law altogether. Sadly, part of this group includes party bosses of Stalinist mold who squandered the opportunity to be a part of the reform while they were in the driver’s seat.
CLUSTER 2 includes people who are open to reform but harbor deep-rooted fear that it may lead to an anti-Tigray campaign. They have legitimate fears that if left unchecked some elements of the euphoric groups can target Tigryans and Tigrayan businesses outside of the proper of Tigray. They are also fearful that the reform can rollback Tigryan gains of the last 27 years. TPLF members who are ambivalent about the current reform find themselves in a bind. Jumping on the reform bandwagon may have a risk of joining a force that is seen by the people of Tigray as a potential threat to their interest. Complicating matters, some within this group feel Tigryan youths have paid life and limb to free Ethiopia of Mengistu’s regime. Therefore, whatever Tigray has gained under TPLF’s regime is earned and the reform should stay clear from them.
CLUSTER 3, a minority, supports the reform, while still worrying about its consequence in terms of alienating if not targeting the people of Tigray.
THE GOVERNMENT’S CHALLENGES
From the perspective of PM Abiy’s reform, the most concerning cluster is CLUSTER 1 of the euphoric group. If not reined in, it can begin to build up political momentum and inertia that can derail the democratic reform. In the worst case, it can grow into its more virulent form, potentially leading to an anti-Tigray animus.
This group contributes nothing to the PM’s agenda but serves as a political tool to CLUSTER 1 of the TPLF faction. It can be used to rally the people of Tigray against the reform. In short, its rhetoric and virulent animus will inject fuel into, and jump-start, TPLF’s political machinery. If not nipped in the bud, it can push CLUSTERS 2 and 3 of the dysphoria group into the camp of the chronically intransigent Cluster 1.
The PM and his administration need to reject this group publicly, unequivocally and consistently. Those who take their tribe-based rhetoric into the realm of inciting violent action need to be dealt with swiftly to the fullest extent of the law as a lesson to others. We should not wait until people are stoned to death or hacked with machetes or businesses are destroyed. Inciting ethnic-based violence should be treated as inciting a potential civil war. It must be stopped.
The government’s effort should focus on Clusters 2 and 3 of both sides of the political divide. That is where reasonable and constructive dialogue can be cultivated.
DEALING WITH GROUP 1 OF THE OPPOSITION
This is a group that is in a desperate political situation. It is still in a state of delusion that it can reverse the course of the reform by creating instability. In this regard, it will not stop at anything, including an act of terror. The government has no option but to take the necessary legal, political and diplomatic measures to create enough pressure to bring it to the reform table. If it persists in its delusion, the government should go after the linchpins of the group while courting reform minded members of TPLF leadership to take bolder and constructive steps.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF TPLF’S POLITICS
For 27 years TPLF has used the media to crate false pride in the people of Tigray, cultivating them as special bread of warriors and as invincible in the battlefield. This was done partly to alleviate any worries and fears that they might have had about the wisdom of tribal politics in a country they constitute a small minority. The abrupt change brought with it not only political challenges but also psychological ones. Understanding this helps us in being sensitive to the way we are undertaking the reform. This is not to say we need to slow or halt the substance of the ongoing reform. It is the process that we need to be mindful of.
TAKING PROACTIVE STEPS TO ADDRESS PERCEIVED AND REAL THREATS TO THE PEOPLE OF TIGRAY
TPLF has decades of far-reaching use of propaganda, misinformation and outright scare tactics to keep the people of Tigray behind it. The government should work on many fronts to counter and defuse the propaganda campaign and address the concerns and fears of the people.
