Mekelle፡ October 9,2024 (Tigray Herald)
By Yerga Yaecobe
The claim that the Tigray genocide was “unpreventable” ignores a series of critical missteps, strategic failures, and political decisions that could have altered the course of events and safeguarded the people of Tigray. While some may argue that the genocidal war was inevitable, a thorough analysis of the historical, political, and strategic decisions made by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime reveals that proactive measures could have mitigated the risk or minimized the damage. In fact, the genocide was not just a tragic consequence but the culmination of long-term policy failures, internal divisions, and external threats that were either ignored or mismanaged. This analysis challenges the notion of inevitability and argues that with better foresight, stronger leadership, and comprehensive reforms, the Tigray genocide could have been prevented or at least significantly lessened in its devastation.
1. The 1998 Eritrean Invasion and the Strategic Error of Halting Victory
One of the pivotal moments in Tigray’s modern history was the 1998-2000 Eritrean invasion of Tigray, commonly referred to as the Badme War. TPLF-led Ethiopian federal forces were on the verge of total victory, poised to dismantle the Eritrean military threat. Tigrayan military leadership, as well as key politburo members, recognized the long-term security threat posed by the Eritrean regime, which harbored genocidal ambitions against Tigray even then. However, the TPLF leadership made the disastrous decision to halt the military advance, leaving Eritrea intact despite having the capacity to neutralize the regime entirely. This decision was made against the advice of military and political leaders within the TPLF, including General Tsadkan, the chief of staff at the time.
The failure to eliminate this existential threat was a monumental strategic error. Eritrea, under Isaias Afwerki, was never content with peace. Instead, it spent the following decades preparing for revenge, constantly mobilizing and plotting against Tigray. The genocidal war that began in 2020 was, in many ways, a continuation of this unresolved conflict. Had the TPLF leadership not stopped short in 2000, the Eritrean regime could have been neutralized, preventing it from playing a leading role in the genocidal alliance that ultimately devastated Tigray.
2. TPLF’s Internal Divisions and Corruption Post-2000
Another critical factor in the preventability of the genocide was the fragmentation and internal weakening of the TPLF following the war with Eritrea. The 2000 split within the TPLF leadership left the party fractured, and its ability to lead Tigray in a unified manner was significantly compromised. From that point forward, the TPLF became increasingly embroiled in internal conflicts, allowing corruption, nepotism, and self-interest groups to dominate the political landscape. This shift led to a gradual erosion of trust between the TPLF leadership and the people of Tigray, weakening the party’s legitimacy and capacity to make sound strategic decisions.
These internal weaknesses emboldened external enemies. Eritrea and its allies observed the growing internal strife within the TPLF and recognized an opportunity to exploit it. The failure to address internal corruption and unite the party in defense of Tigray’s long-term security interests meant that the TPLF became increasingly reactive rather than proactive in addressing threats. Had the TPLF reformed its political system, rooted out corruption, and restored internal unity, it could have mobilized Tigray more effectively and anticipated the dangers that culminated in genocide.
3. Economic and Diplomatic Missteps: GERD and Tigray’s Security
One of the most significant geopolitical missteps made by the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government was the initiation of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). While the dam was framed as a symbol of national pride and a path to economic prosperity, it also created serious geopolitical tensions in the region, particularly with Egypt and Sudan. More importantly, it exposed Tigray to severe security risks.
Tigray’s geographical position made it vulnerable to retaliation from external actors. The Ethiopian government’s focus on the GERD diverted attention away from the deteriorating security situation in Tigray’s immediate neighborhood. Tigray’s leadership failed to anticipate the geopolitical fallout from this project and its potential to destabilize regional security, making the region more vulnerable to attacks from Eritrea and internal enemies emboldened by external actors.
Had the TPLF prioritized building a more diversified economy and pursued a more diplomatically cautious approach, particularly in avoiding large-scale projects like GERD that provoked hostility from neighboring countries, the region could have fostered stronger alliances and enhanced its security.
4. Failure to Implement True Federalism and Decentralization
The TPLF leadership’s failure to fully implement true federalism and decentralization was another critical factor that left Tigray exposed. Despite being the architects of Ethiopia’s federal system, the TPLF did not decentralize power effectively, leaving the system vulnerable to manipulation by centralist forces such as those represented by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The lack of genuine decentralization allowed the federal government to accumulate excessive power, which was ultimately turned against Tigray in the genocidal war.
Had Tigray’s leadership pushed for a more robust federal system or even confederation, Tigray could have maintained greater autonomy and built stronger local institutions capable of defending the region. A confederation would have allowed Tigray to retain more control over its military and economic affairs, reducing its dependency on a hostile central government.
5. Ignoring the People’s Concerns and the Rise of Abiy Ahmed
One of the most egregious failures of the TPLF leadership, particularly under Debretsion Gebremichael, was its consistent disregard for the concerns and warnings of the Tigrayan people. Despite growing discontent and increasing threats from Abiy Ahmed’s administration, the TPLF leadership remained complacent, failing to act decisively to protect Tigray.
The rise of Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018 was a clear warning sign of the danger that awaited Tigray. His consolidation of power and efforts to dismantle federalism should have prompted an immediate and robust response from the TPLF leadership. Instead, they allowed Abiy to centralize authority and sideline Tigray politically and economically. This failure to anticipate Abiy’s power grab and mobilize a comprehensive response to his authoritarianism was a critical mistake that allowed the situation to spiral into genocide.
6. Lack of Sophisticated Intelligence Gathering
One of the hallmarks of effective leadership is the ability to anticipate and prevent threats before they materialize. The TPLF leadership, particularly in its later years, lacked a sophisticated intelligence-gathering apparatus that could have identified the imminent genocidal threat posed by Eritrea, the Ethiopian federal government under Abiy Ahmed, and their external allies. The genocidal war was not a sudden or unforeseen event—it was the product of years of planning and preparation by enemies of Tigray.
Had the TPLF invested in a more sophisticated intelligence network, they could have better anticipated their adversaries’ moves and developed counter-strategies. The failure to do so left Tigray vulnerable to a well-coordinated and meticulously planned genocidal campaign that caught its leadership off guard.
Conclusion: A Genocide That Could Have Been Prevented
The argument that the Tigray genocide was “unpreventable” is not only misleading but dangerously dismissive of the critical decisions that shaped these tragic events. The genocide was not the result of fate or an unavoidable consequence of regional dynamics—it was the result of long-term policy failures, strategic missteps, internal divisions, and a failure to recognize and address emerging threats.
With better foresight, stronger leadership, and more proactive reforms, Tigray could have strengthened its position and safeguarded its people from the atrocities that followed. A comprehensive, democratic federalism, reform of TPLF’s internal politics, stronger diplomatic strategies, and a robust intelligence network could have changed the course of history. Those who claim the genocide was unpreventable overlook the many opportunities that existed to protect Tigray from this dark chapter in its history.
Powerful emotional narratives must focus on the tragedy of these lost opportunities—the thousands of lives that could have been saved, the cultural heritage that could have been preserved, and the future of Tigray that could have been brighter had its leadership not failed at critical junctures. The message is clear: the Tigray genocide was preventable, and its avoidability must serve as a lesson to future generations. “Never again” means taking every possible step to protect against such atrocities, and Tigray’s experience shows that genocide is not inevitable—it is the result of choices, both made and unmade.
